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Fraud on Any Market
GREGORY DAY*, JOHN T. HOLDEN** & BRIAN M. MILLS***
Claims of securities fraud had historically failed because investors seldom rely on
false or misleading statements when transacting securities. To bolster confidence in
securities markets, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a doctrine called “fraud-on-themarket” so that duped investors can show detrimental reliance without ever
encountering the fraudulent statements. The doctrine assumes that a stock’s price
reflects all material information, meaning that an investor who bought tainted stock
has constructively relied on the fraud.
Fraud-on-the-market is not only unavailable in other markets but is also
embattled within securities law. The doctrine has endured volleys of criticisms about
whether markets actually absorb information, leading critics to believe that the
Supreme Court would eliminate it in 2014. The Court did not. In light of persistent
questions about whether the doctrine reflects reality or has outlived its purpose, our
empirical research tests fraud-on-the-market’s viability by investigating sports
gambling: we find that the doctrine provides a sound remedy for investors in any
market.
The sports wagering market operates like others in which defrauded individuals
have historically failed to support their fraud claims due to a lack of reliance. We
show that securities and gambling markets suffer from many of the same frailties.
Chief among them is that both investors and bettors place money in markets where
they lack information about deception, cheating, and fraud. And like investors rely
on prices affected by fraud, gamblers reference wagering information based on the
playing field: if deception enables a team to fare better or worse, this skews the
betting lines on which gamblers rely. The difference between these markets, though,
is that investors enjoy a body of securities law to condemn fraud.
We first argue that fraud-on-the-market would benefit most types of investable
markets like sports gambling and support the doctrine in the securities context.
Despite criticisms of the doctrine, our analysis shows that fraud creates the
presumption of distorted prices. Second, the money wagered via sports betting and
daily fantasy sports (DFS) would generate damages such that leagues would better
maintain a competitive environment, boosting sports integrity akin to how securities
regulations provide market protections. Also, our argument recognizes the inequity
of denying sports bettors and DFS users a remedy. Whereas the leagues had
traditionally benefited from gambling indirectly, today, the NFL, NHL, MLB, and
NBA have partnered with DFS and other gambling industry companies. Since the
leagues now benefit directly from gambling, and lucratively so, they should owe their
fans a truly competitive landscape.

* Gregory Day is an assistant professor in the University of Georgia Terry College of
Business and holds a courtesy appointment at the University of Georgia School of Law.
** John T. Holden is an assistant professor in the Department of Management in the
Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University.
*** Brian M. Mills is an Associate Professor in the Department of Kinesiology & Health
Education in the College of Education at the University of Texas at Austin.
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INTRODUCTION
Claims of securities fraud had historically failed because investors seldom rely on
false or misleading statements when transacting securities.1 To bolster confidence in
securities markets, the Supreme Court embraced a doctrine known as “fraud-on-themarket” to address how fraud distorts market prices.2 It rests on the theory that a
stock’s price reflects material information about the underlying firm, indicating that
one who buys tainted stock has constructively relied on the fraud.3 A price distorted

1. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 157–58 (2009) (explaining the difficulty of reliance in securities litigation).
2. Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 403 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (explaining
that securities regulations and fraud-on-the-market are meant to “instill confidence in the
securities markets”).
3. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The fraud on the market theory
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by fraud may thus cause investors to misjudge the likelihood of making money,
which justifies allowing them to support a fraud claim without ever knowing of the
misstatements.
Fraud-on-the-market is not only unavailable in other markets, but it is embattled
in securities litigation. The doctrine has endured volleys of criticism about whether
markets actually absorb information.4 Observers had even believed that the Supreme
Court intended to eliminate it in 2014—the Court did not.5 While the doctrine
remains good law, questions persist about whether it reflects reality or has outlived
its purpose.6 Our empirical research examines fraud-on-the-market by investigating
sports gambling markets: we find that the doctrine provides a sound remedy for
investors in any market.
Rather than a trivial industry, estimates suggest people wager up to $3 trillion on
sports annually.7 The amount legally wagered on sports in the United States has
tripled since the Supreme Court enabled states to legalize sports wagering in 2018.8
Propelling sports gambling even further is the rise of daily fantasy sports (DFS),
which entails a gambling platform based off fantasy sport’s template—remarkably,
fifty-seven million people wagered over $350 million via DFS in 2016 alone.9 This
burgeoning market has inspired the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL to partner with DFS
companies such as DraftKings and FanDuel.10 Reports in 2021 have even found that
the NHL bought equity stakes in sportsbooks, raising questions about how deeply
the leagues are leveraged in the sports wagering industry.11 In Europe, seventeen out

is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a
company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company
and its business. Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. The misstatements may affect the price
of the stock, and thus defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock’s
value.” (citation omitted)).
4. See infra Section III.C.3 (discussing the criticisms of fraud-on-the-market).
5. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274 (2014) (refusing to
overrule Basic); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market:
Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 38–39
(2015) (discussing the anticipation over whether the Supreme Court would terminate the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine).
6. See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, Halliburton, Basic, and Fraud on the Market: The
Need for a New Paradigm, 60 VILL. L. REV. 203, 208 (2015) (discussing the need to replace
fraud-on-the-market).
7. Samantha Beckett, Global Sports Betting Market Worth $3 Trillion, CASINO.ORG
(Apr. 20, 2015, 5:03 AM), https://www.casino.org/news/global-sports-betting-market-worth3-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/CH3Z-NQB6].
8. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018) (holding that
the states may enact statutes permitting sports wagering).
9. Chris Grove, 3 Reasons Why the Feds Should Approve the Merger of Draftkings and
Fanduel, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 16, 2017), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
14418/approve-draftkings-fanduel-merger/ [https://perma.cc/BF5L-S3WH].
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. Matthew Waters, NHL Deepens Legal Sportsbook Ties with PointsBet Equity Stake,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/48115/nhl-pointsbetequity-stake/ [https://perma.cc/WHH7-TX23].
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of twenty teams in the English Premier League have partnered with a betting brand12
while ten of twenty teams adorn a gambling company’s logo on their jerseys.13 In the
United States, the sports gambling market equates to the eighth largest stock
exchange in the world.14
Despite the economic stakes, cheating is prevalent in sports.15 For example, the
Houston Astros cheated in 2017 when they won the World Series: team executives
used illicit means of decoding and transmitting their opponents’ signs so that batters
knew whether the opposing pitcher intended to throw a fastball or curveball.16
Scandals in the NFL include Deflategate, Spygate, and Bountygate.17 In fact, an NBA

12. David Camilleri, The Evolution of Premier League Betting Sponsorship, PUNTERS
PAGE,
https://www.thepunterspage.com/evolution-premier-league-betting-sponsorship/
[https://perma.cc/C42Y-EVMZ].
13. Rob Davies, Half of Premier League Clubs to Have Gambling Sponsors for 2019-20
Season, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2019, 12:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/
2019/jul/19/half-of-premier-league-clubs-to-have-gambling-sponsors-for-201920
[https://perma.cc/EZ4C-WQA2]; see also Charlie Walker, Premier League and EFL Clubs
Will Lose £110million in Sponsorship if Betting Companies Are Banned from Advertising on
Shirts in a Government Review of Gambling Launched on Tuesday, MAILONLINE (Dec. 8, 2020;
7:22 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk
/sport/sportsnews/article-9029921/Premier-League-Championship-clubs-lose-110-millionbetting-companies-banned-shirts.html [https://perma.cc/4W9R-VUEA].
14. Since the sports gambling market is estimated to fall within the $3 trillion–$4 trillion
range, it would likely fall somewhere between the sixth and ninth largest stock exchange. See
Aran Ali, The World’s 10 Largest Stock Markets, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-worlds-10-largest-stock-markets/
[https://perma.cc/BBX7-CSS5].
15. We use the term “cheating” broadly. For purposes of this Article, this term includes
deceptions that may not violate written rules but violate the spirit of the rules. For instance,
the use of performance-enhancing drugs during the 1990s, though largely illegal, was not
against MLB rules; however, there is a strong argument to be made that the use of these
substances violated the spirit of the league’s rules.
16. Indeed, there is some debate about whether the Astros violated a specific rule that
existed at the time. While there may not have been a rule in the MLB rule book against stealing
signs, MLB issued a directive in 2001 that prohibited the use of electronic devices or
binoculars in the dugout. See David Schoenfield, Everything You Need to Know About SignStealing, ESPN (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.espn.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/82491
/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sign-stealing [https://perma.cc/W596-DMCK]. The
irony of the Astros’ cheating scandal was that it relied on monitors that had been installed by
MLB in 2014 as part of what was meant to be an integrity-enhancing feature—video replay.
See Tom Verducci, Why MLB Issued Historic Punishment to Astros for Sign Stealing, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/01/13/houston-astros-cheatingpunishment [https://perma.cc/VZN7-LV3N].
17. Jason Gay, Deflategate’s Endless Hissing Contest, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2016, 6:35
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deflategates-endless-hissing-contest-1461623705?
mg=prod/com-wsj [https://perma.cc/QWW3-NBYS]; Carl Bialik & Jason Fry, ‘Spygate’
Between Pats, Jets Is Really a Family Quarrel, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2007, 12:01 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118960478308725115
[https://perma.cc/6QGC-XYQD];
Lynn Zinser, Bountygate: A Circular, Confusing History, N.Y. TIMES: THE FIFTH DOWN (Oct.
10, 2012, 3:10 PM), https://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/bountygate-a-circularconfusing-history/ [https://perma.cc/MXH6-SHWL]; The Times-Picayune, Full NFL
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referee sold inside information to gamblers between 2005 and 2007 and even may
have fixed games.18 In 2006, the Italian soccer league stripped powerhouse Juventus
of two titles and relegated them for colluding with the league’s referees.19
But akin to how claims of securities fraud had traditionally failed, fans and
gamblers can rarely if ever redress cheating since they lack reliance.20 For example,
the Southern District of New York rejected a lawsuit in 2020 by users of DraftKings
who alleged fraud against MLB after betting on games tainted by the Astros’ cheating
affair.21 It ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show reliance on any statements by MLB
about the fairness of its games even though MLB has profited from the gamblers’
wagers via its partnership with DraftKings—MLB had even owned a stake in
DraftKings.22 A public policy explaining why courts have long deprived gamblers of
remedies against leagues is the belief that wagering would cause gamblers to fix
games.23
Without the threat of liability, critics assert that leagues are more concerned about
guarding their images than identifying cheating or meaningfully punishing teams and
players. When journalists unearthed the Astros’ cheating scandal, MLB stripped the
Astros of draft choices and $5 million even though the value of winning a World
Series far exceeds that amount.24 The players who executed the scheme received no
punishment.25 When an NBA referee conspired with gamblers, the scheme was
uncovered by an FBI investigation into organized crime rather than the NBA’s

Statement into 'Bounty' Program Run by New Orleans Saints, NOLA.COM (Mar. 3, 2012, 1:46
AM),
https://www.nola.com/sports/saints/article_8742fc0b-72a7-5a8d-998db425ffee06df.html [https://perma.cc/8MUZ-Q32N].
18. Norman Chad, Tim Donaghy Fixed NBA Games Under David Stern’s Watch. They
Are Both to Blame, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports
/tim-donaghy-fixed-nba-games-under-david-sterns-watch-they-are-both-toblame/2019/03/03/e217dce0-3d3e-11e9-a06c-3ec8ed509d15_story.html
[https://perma.cc/DS4C-YWCC].
19. Shamoon Hafez, Calciopoli: The Scandal that Rocked Italy and Left Juventus in Serie
B, BBC SPORT (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/49910626
[https://perma.cc/S8PL-7XDM] (explaining the Calciopoli scandal).
20. Murdock, supra note 6, at 237.
21. Olson v. Major League Baseball, 447 F. Supp. 3d 159, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
22. Id. at 167 (“[T]his only reinforces the conclusion that what is known to the plaintiff,
his own reliance, must be alleged with particularity. But here, the complaint does not even
allege that the plaintiffs ‘saw, read, or otherwise noticed’ any of the few actionable
misrepresentations noted above, and thus completely fails to meet this standard.”).
23. See Harry Lyles, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Sports Gambling Decision Won’t Ruin
Sports Because Any Damage is Already Done, SBNATION (May 15, 2018, 8:30 AM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/5/15/17352742/sports-betting-supreme-court-experience
[https://perma.cc/2A84-R88N] (noting that match fixing was one of the fears associated with
increased legalized sports betting).
24. See Maury Brown, Astros Sign-Stealing Scandal Aftermath: Luhnow and Hinch
Fired, Loss of Draft Picks, $5M Fine, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020, 2:51 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2020/01/13/luhnow-hinch-suspended-loss-ofdraft-picks-5m-fine-for-astros-sign-stealing-scandal/?sh=5c7ab426730a
[https://perma.cc/9SXZ-NK8P] (detailing the punishments).
25. Id. (noting that no players were penalized among the sanctions).
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efforts.26 In football, the strategy of preserving the NFL’s brand is known as
“protecting the shield.”27
If gamblers could plead fraud-on-the-market, we argue that it would
counterintuitively enhance sports integrity and recognize that the same injuries
affecting securities plague other investable markets. This is because both securities
fraud and sports cheating create an identical problem where misinformation distorts
prices. With securities, misstatements cause a person to misperceive the odds of an
investment paying off—e.g., the investor expects the stock’s value to appreciate
above the price at which it was bought.28 Just like how investors are defrauded when
misstatements induce them to buy securities at inflated prices, gamblers operating
under false information will misperceive a match’s true odds to their detriment. But
whereas fraud-on-the-market enables investors to show reliance on a security’s price,
gamblers cannot invoke this doctrine even though an overperforming team aided by
cheating would perhaps skew betting lines.29 If fraud-on-the-market reflects how
fraud or cheating distorts prices—a source of great contention—then the doctrine
should enable gamblers and other types of investors to show reliance on market
prices.
We test the validity of fraud-on-the-market as a whole by showing how private
information alters prices in betting markets akin to securities fraud. During the 2015
MLB season, critical aspects of the ball changed, which MLB denied.30 We find that
the new balls took flight in a materially different way than old ones—specifically,
drag was reduced—affecting the nature of scoring. Our empirical analysis
demonstrates that MLB’s misleading statements about whether anything about the
baseballs had changed dramatically altered the odds of winning certain bets around

26. Scott Eden, From the Archives: How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA
Games, ESPN (July 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-formerref-tim-donaghy-conspired-fix-nba-games [https://perma.cc/NA53-3QY8]; Jack Delaney,
Reports Confirm Former Ref Tim Donaghy Fixed Games, BASKETBALL FOREVER (Feb. 19,
2019),
https://basketballforever.com/2019/02/19/disgraced-nba-referee-tim-donaghyadmitted-he-would-fail-polygraph-if-asked-if-he-fixed-nba-games [https://perma.cc/WJG4Y94U].
(Dec.
26,
2013),
27. Hua
Hsu,
Sword
and
Shield,
GRANTLAND
https://grantland.com/features/the-nfl-very-bad-year/ [https://perma.cc/J3HH-Q6FL] (noting
the origins of “protecting the shield”).
28. Murdock, supra note 6, at 209.
29. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (explaining fraud-on-themarket); Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the
Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 970 (2019) (providing the law and
theory of fraud-on-the-market). Historically, there may have been an argument that because
of sports betting’s illegality, there should not have been a remedy for sports bettors. Times
have changed, however, with more than twenty states having legalized sports betting, and
more than thirty-five having explored using sports betting as a means to fill budget holes. John
T. Holden & Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Sports Gambling and the Law: How America
Regulates Its Most Lucrative Vice, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 907, 932–33 (2020) (describing the
historical treatment of sports gambling in the United States).
30. Jake Kaplan, Rob Manfred ‘Absolutely Certain’ Baseballs Fall Within Specifications,
CHRON (July 11, 2017), https://www.chron.com/sports/astros/article/Rob-Manfred-certainbaseballs-not-juiced-11280991.php [https://perma.cc/4JJS-YQWP].
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the 2015 All-Star Game: a wagering strategy that would have previously won
reversed into a losing one.31 Just like with securities fraud, misinformation distorted
market prices in ways harming gamblers. By implication, gamblers assessed the odds
of games based on market prices without accounting for the destabilizing effects of
duplicitous conduct. Recalling the doubts over whether securities fraud can actually
be expected to alter prices, our research supports this presumption in the securities
context as well as in other investable markets.
In short, we argue that embracing fraud-on-the-market across the sea of investable
markets, like sports gambling, would achieve the doctrine’s very purpose: it would
increase integrity and remedy meritorious injuries. Despite criticisms that fraud-onthe-market fails to reflect reality, our analysis shows that fraud does in fact create the
presumption of distorted prices on which people like gamblers and investors rely.
Second, the money wagered via sports betting would generate sizeable damages after
an episode of cheating, which would force leagues to offer a competitive
environment, or at least proactively police misconduct. This would boost sports’
integrity to the degree that securities regulation has helped to create confidence in
stock markets. Our argument also recognizes the inequity of denying bettors and DFS
users a remedy.32 Whereas the leagues had traditionally benefited from gambling
indirectly, today, the NFL, NHL, MLB, and NBA have partnered with those
companies themselves as well as brokers of gambling data.33 Since the leagues
benefit directly from gambling, and lucratively so, they should owe their fans a
competitive landscape.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly details the rich history of cheating
in sports. It traces not only instances where teams and players impaired the
competitive landscape, but also where gamblers sought to manipulate results for
personal enrichment. Part II’s analysis of case law reviews the obstacles encountered
by fans, gamblers, and spectators when they seek a remedy for cheating. In nearly
every instance, courts have dismissed lawsuits against teams and leagues, insulating
them from legal liability. Part III argues that cheating creates the precise harms

31. See infra Section III.D.
32. As Professor Christine Hurt noted in 2006, “the stereotype of an investor as a gambler
seems particularly well deserved.” Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private
Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 371, 373 (2006). Professor Hurt argues that while some investors do research about
securities purchases, some do not, and instead act on a “feeling.” Id. Despite similarities in the
realities of investing and gambling, the two activities are treated differently. Id. at 373–74.
Hurt advocated for revisions to the regulatory model that would no longer use antiquated terms
as the basis for different forms of regulation but would instead use the level of speculation in
an activity to determine its regulatory structure. Id. at 375–76. On a continuum of
entertainment to utility, Hurt categorizes sports betting alongside trading in individual stocks.
Id. at 378.
33. Both leagues and teams have formed partnerships with a variety of DFS and gambling
operators. See US Sportsbook and Casino Team Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting-deals/ [https://perma.cc/
E6FS-RQCR] (listing league and team sports betting partnerships); see also DFS Partnership
/ Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
dfs-sponsorship-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/8VEC-KBYQ] (listing league and team DFS
partnerships).
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remedied by securities law. Now that the leagues have partnered with, and profit
from, FanDuel, DraftKings, and the DFS industry altogether, gamblers are akin to
investors in public firms who rely on the market prices set based on an ostensibly
fair landscape. The last Section in this Part discusses the implications of our findings,
explaining other investable markets such as art and cryptocurrencies that could likely
benefit from embracing the fraud-on-the-market theory.
I. A SHORT REVIEW OF CHEATING’S LONG HISTORY
Cheating in sports occurs for a myriad of reasons. Just as the reward of personal
accomplishment motivates players to cheat, the same incentives drive teams and
executives who can similarly profit from winning. If this was not enough, gamblers
have long been associated with threatening the integrity of competition by inducing
players to throw matches. The result is a rich history of cheating that spans essentially
all sports.
A. A Brief History of Cheating
The chief source of cheating in sports has historically stemmed from gambling.
Most famously, eight members of the heavily favored Chicago White Sox were
accused of throwing the 1919 World Series at the urging of organized crime figure
Arnold Rothstein.34 One of the “Black Sox” players testified that he was jealous of
the money paid to members of the Chicago Cubs for throwing the previous year's
World Series.35 This scandal decimated baseball, produced eight lifetime
suspensions (including “Shoeless” Joe Jackson),36 and resulted in the edict posted in
every MLB clubhouse that players may not gamble on baseball.37
Executives in other leagues have expressed the same anxieties about gambling.38
Such concern was far from unfounded. The FBI alleged in 2007 that former NBA

34. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and
Economics Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 455 (2015) (noting that Rothstein allegedly
bribed eight members of the Chicago White Sox and that the players were eventually put on
trial for charges, including conspiring to defraud the public).
35. Holden & Edelman, supra note 29, at 913.
36. Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 34, at 455. Baseball’s first commissioner was Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who began his appointment by famously stating:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player who throws a ballgame, no
player that undertakes or promises to throw a ballgame, no player that
sits in conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where
the ways and means of throwing a game are discussed and does not
promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional baseball.
Id.

37. Rule 21; Misconduct, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, http://content.mlb.com/documents
/8/2/2/296982822/Major_League_Rule_21.pdf (“(g) RULE TO BE KEPT POSTED. A
printed copy in English and Spanish of this Rule 21 shall be kept posted in each clubhouse.”).
38. Brett Smiley, Where Major Sports Leagues Stand on Gambling Legislation in the
U.S., SPORTSHANDLE (Aug. 19, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/gambling-legislation-lawsunited-states-leagues-commissioners/ [https://perma.cc/96JJ-Y4C5].
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referee Tim Donaghy fed offshore gamblers information about which teams were
likely to win, including games that he was officiating.39 In the NFL, the league
suspended two stars—Paul Hornung of the Green Bay Packers and Alex Karras of
the Detroit Lions—for betting on football games and associating with “known
hoodlums.”40
Compared to professional athletes, gamblers can more easily induce amateur
athletes who have more to gain (e.g., the value of a bribe next to their zero-dollar
salaries) and less to lose (e.g., a professional athlete risks millions of dollars whereas
amateur athletes play for minimal pay).41 For instance, a common scheme in college
sports involves “point shaving,” which can be easy to accomplish and hard to
detect.42 A player who shaves points may alter wagering outcomes without affecting
the game’s result, helping the scheme to fly under the radar. In basketball, one must
only miss enough shots to win by a certain margin, less than the point-spread.43 An
abridged list of point shaving scandals includes basketball teams from Boston
College,44 Tulane University,45 and Arizona State University.46
Point shaving has even been found in college football. In 2007, players for the
University of Toledo were indicted for conspiring with gamblers.47 During the 2005

39. See Eden, supra note 26.
40. Larry Schwartz, Hornung, Karras Suspended for Betting on NFL, ESPN (Nov. 19,
2003), http://www.espn.com/classic/s/moment010417hornung-karras-betting.html [https://
perma.cc/WKC2-6FZF]. Then-NFL commissioner, Pete Rozelle, describing the incident, said:
“No bribes, no game-fixing or point-shaving. The only evidence uncovered in this
investigation, which included 52 interviews with players on eight teams, was the bets by the
players penalized. All of these bets were on their own teams to win or on other NFL games.”
See Tex Maule, SI Vault: Players Are Not Just People: The NFL Suspends Its ‘Golden Boy,’
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 12, 2015), https://www.si.com/nfl/2015/05/12/si-vault-paulhornung-alex-karras-pete-rozelle [https://perma.cc/2422-NE9S].
41. See Justin Wolfers, Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 279 (2006), (analyzing point shaving in college basketball). Wolfers’s findings about the
prevalence of point shaving in college basketball have been the subject of critique, however,
these critiques are largely beyond the scope of this Article. See Richard Borghesi, Rodney
Paul & Andy Weinbach, Totals Markets as Evidence Against Widespread Point Shaving, 4 J.
PREDICTION MKTS. 15, 18–21 (2010) (finding that the prevalence of point shaving in college
basketball is likely not widespread).
42. Wolfers, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. David Purdum, ‘The Worst Fix Ever,’ ESPN (Oct. 3, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/espn/chalk/story/_/id/11633538/betting-chronicling-worst-fix-ever1978-79-bc-point-shaving-scandal [https://perma.cc/N2Y6-C5SA] (detailing the 1978–79
scandal).
45. Frances Frank Marcus, 8 Indicted in Tulane Scandal; School to Give Up Basketball,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/05/sports/8-indicted-in-tulanescandal-school-to-give-up-basketball.html [https://perma.cc/76SC-4PQC].
46. Stevin (Hedake) Smith, Confessions of a Point Shaver Former Arizona State Star
Hedake Smith Reveals How He and His Accomplices Fixed Basketball Games, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 9, 1998), https://vault.si.com/vault/1998/11/09/confessions-of-a-pointshaver-former-arizona-state-star-hedake-smith-reveals-how-he-and-his-accomplices-fixedbasketball-games.
47. Mike Fish, Six Ex-Players Charged with Conspiracy, ESPN (May 6, 2009),
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GMAC Bowl, running back Quinton Broussard admitted that he intentionally
fumbled the ball in exchange for $500.48
Perhaps the most easily manipulatable events involve individual sports. Due to
the lack of collective action issues—as gamblers must only compromise one
player—few sports have seen as much match-fixing as boxing.49 Allegations include
a 2019 event in which Floyd Mayweather Jr.’s opponent seemed to throw the
match.50 At the 2016 Olympics, officials dismissed referees and judges following
evidence of fraud.51 Then in 2021, Barstool Sports promoted a fight, took bets on
that fight, and then watched as one of the boxers, Jose Canseco, allegedly “took a
dive.”52
While gambling’s entanglement with boxing is well publicized, it is lesser known
that sports such as tennis have experienced similar scandals. Not only have tennis
players received lifetime bans in the past two years,53 but the BBC also found
potential match-fixing among the top fifty players,54 even compromising Wimbledon
competitors.55 Tipping off investigators, Russian and Italian gamblers bet
suspiciously large sums on Martin Vassallo Arguello in his contest against Nikolay
Davydenko.56 The gamblers favored Arguello during the match even as he was being
dominated by Davydenko who was known as the superior player.57 When

https://www.espn.com/college-sports/news/story?id=4146980
[https://perma.cc/7QD2A7GL].
48. Nicholas Piotrowicz, Former UT Players Sentenced for Point-Shaving, TOLEDO
BLADE (Apr. 1, 2015, 12:53 PM), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/courts/2015/04/01/UTplayers-sentenced-for-point-shaving/stories/20150401066 [https://perma.cc/4LZT-SVNY].
49. Dimitar Ivanov, Are Boxing Matches Fixed? Why Yes and Why No, SHORTBOXING,
https://shortboxing.com/are-boxing-matches-fixed-why-yes-and-why-no/
[https://perma.cc/S9UN-VZD4].
50. Fernando Quiles Jr., Chael Sonnen Says Tenshin Nasukawa ‘Did the Job’ for Floyd
Mayweather, MMA NEWS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.mmanews.com/chael-sonnennasukawa-job-mayweather/ [https://perma.cc/AZ5G-CGFL].
51. Ken Belson & Scott Blumenthal, Dismissal of Rio Boxing Judges Robed in Secrecy,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/sports/olympics/boxingjudges-dismissal-robed-in-secrecy.html [https://perma.cc/665P-JFNM]; Sean Ingle, Judges
‘Used Signals’ to Fix Olympic Boxing Bouts, McLaren Report Finds, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30,
2021, 2:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/sep/30/judges-signals-fixolympic-boxing-bouts-mclaren-report [https://perma.cc/P52K-K29X].
52. Matt Schoch, Barstool Sports Fight Under Investigation After Jose Canseco ‘Took a
Dive,’ PLAYMICHIGAN.COM (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.playmichigan.com/barstoolsportsbook-controversy-jose-canseco/ [https://perma.cc/Z3DA-LKHX].
53. Youssef Hossam Receives Lifetime Ban for Match-Fixing, REUTERS (May 4, 2020,
11:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tennis-tennis-hossam-ban/youssef-hossamreceives-lifetime-ban-for-match-fixing-idUSKBN22H07U [https://perma.cc/3BJJ-AQ8Q].
54. Simon Cox, Tennis Match Fixing: Evidence of Suspected Match-Fixing Revealed,
(Jan.
18,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/sport/tennis/35319202
BBC
SPORT
[https://perma.cc/P7MY-TT99].
55. Id.
56. Simon Cox, The Tennis Files: Have Top Players Been Paid to Lose?, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35325473 [https://perma.cc/5EJHC55J].
57. Id.
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Davydenko forfeited in the second set upon claiming a sprained ankle, the gamblers
appeared prophetic.58
Although gambling may drive a bulk of cheating, players and teams have also
broken the rules for the simple motivation of winning. For instance, a trilogy of
“gate” scandals like Bountygate,59 Spygate,60 and Deflategate have overwhelmed the
NFL.61 The first was a secret bounty program in which coaches of the New Orleans
Saints rewarded players for injuring opposing players.62 Although the operation
ended in 2011, the Saints won the Super Bowl in 2010 during (and perhaps due in
part to) Bountygate.63 The New England Patriots used brain, as opposed to brawn,
by first videotaping their opponents’ hand signals in the Spygate scandal and then, a
few years later, using balls inflated below league rules to appease then-quarterback
Tom Brady.64 After winning the AFC Championship game with deflated balls, the
Patriots advanced to win their next game: the 2014 Super Bowl. The Patriots were
again in the public’s eye upon the Spygate 2.0 scandal where the team, once again,
allegedly videotaped opponents.65
Like in the NFL, technology has famously aided cheating in other sports, such as
baseball—e.g., the Astros’ championship in 2017 discussed in the Introduction. One
year later, the Red Sox won the World Series while also stealing signs via video.66

58. Id.
59. Jesse Reed, Reviewing the Complete Timeline of NFL, Saints Bountygate Scandal,
BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 11, 2012), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1441646-reviewing-thecomplete-timeline-of-nfl-saints-bountygate-scandal [https://perma.cc/GQM5-NHE3].
60. Scott Davis, Bombshell ESPN Report Says Patriots’ ‘Spygate’ Scandal Was Way
Worse Than People Realized, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2015, 10:58 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/espn-report-patriots-spygate-scandal-2015-9
[https://perma.cc/QJM4-G62X].
61. Joe Nocera, True Scandal of Deflategate Lies in the N.F.L.’s Behavior, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/sports/football/nfl-ignores-balldeflation-science-at-new-england-patriots-expense.html [https://perma.cc/YKU3-RH4L].
62. Reed, supra note 59.
63. Ed Werder & Darren Rovell, Lowered Suspensions for 2 Players, ESPN (Oct. 9,
2012),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/8483685/roger-goodell-upholds-suspensionsjonathan-vilma-smith [https://perma.cc/88CP-YDVJ]; Derek Estes, New Orleans Saints’
Super Bowl Victory Forever Tarnished by Bountygate, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 2, 2012),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1089270-new-orleans-saints-super-bowl-victory-forevertarnished-by-bountygate [https://perma.cc/9Y7J-U75C].
64. John Branch, The Deflategate Scientists Unlock Their Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/sports/football/deflategate-new-englandpatriots-nfl-science.html [https://perma.cc/3PLJ-PH6C]; Mo Brewington, Detailing the
Events That Made Up Patriots’ Spygate Scandal, EAGLESWIRE: USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2018,
12:05 AM), https://theeagleswire.usatoday.com/2018/01/26/spygate-was-an-inside-job/
[https://perma.cc/3EWA-TT9G].
65. Ben Volin, NFL Nearing End to Investigation into Patriots’ Videotaping Incident
from December, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 26, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
sports/patriots/2020/02/26/nfl-nearing-end-investigation-into-patriots-videotaping-incidentfrom-december/NeoypPAezSSFgf5oqEL4OJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/DG7B-QBCZ].
66. Chris Chavez, Report: Red Sox Illegally Used Reply Room to Steal Signs in 2018,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/01/07/boston-red-soxsign-stealing-allegations-video-replay-room-2018-investigation
[https://perma.cc/L4AX-
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MLB punished the Red Sox by stripping them of a draft pick and banning the
operator of their video replay system for one year.67 The manager, Alex Cora, was
also suspended, but his punishment derived from the Astros’ cheating scandal where
he had previously worked.68
Outside of the United States, cheating in soccer has marred the German
Bundesliga,69 Italian Serie A (twice), and others.70 In the Calciopoli scandal, teams
colluded with the organization of Italian referees to place certain referees where
Juventus, AC Milan, and Lazio benefitted.71 Although Juventus was relegated in
2006 as punishment, it not only returned to Serie A the next year but also won the
division four years later—as well as the next nine championships.72 French, Greek,
Turkish, and Brazilian clubs have perpetrated similar schemes.73 Whereas gambling
motivated the Turkish affair in 2011 resulting in the arrests and convictions of players
and team executives74—the Greek scandal implicated one of Europe’s premier teams,

X6E5].
67. David K. Li, Red Sox Stripped of Draft Pick over 2018 Sign-Stealing Scandal, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/red-sox-strippeddraft-pick-over-2018-sign-stealing-scandal-n1189881 [https://perma.cc/CE7L-6H4J]; Asher
Klein & Raul Martinez, MLB Releases Report on Red Sox Sign-Stealing Probe, Docks Team
a 2020 Draft Pick, NBC 10 BOS. (Apr. 22, 2020, 5:44 PM),
https://www.nbcboston.com/news/sports/red-sox-sign-stealing-investigation-report/2112107/
[https://perma.cc/V48P-SBUV].
68. Id.
69. Axel Falk, How the Biggest Match-Fixing Scandal in Bundesliga History Changed
the German Game Forever, THESE FOOTBALL TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://thesefootballtimes.co/2018/04/20/how-the-biggest-match-fixing-scandal-inbundesliga-history-changed-the-german-game-forever/ [https://perma.cc/EX6E-P8C4].
70. Conor Dowley, A Decade After Italy’s Match-Fixing Scandal, Serie A Is Worse than
It Was Before, SBNATION (July 15, 2016, 11:54 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/
soccer/2016/7/15/12197194/calciopoli-scandal-anniversary-juventus-milan-fiorentina-napoli
[https://perma.cc/3YWB-HZDG].
71. See Hafez, supra note 19.
72. Juventus Clinch Eighth Serie A Title in a Row, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2019, 2:06 PM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-italy-spa-juv-report/juventus-clinch-eighth-serie-atitle-in-a-row-idUKKCN1RW0JU?edition-redirect=uk [https://perma.cc/MRU2-SEEB]; Can
Erözden, Juventus Owns Italy, Winning 9 Straight Titles in Row, AA (July 29, 2020),
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/sports/juventus-owns-italy-winning-9-straight-league-titles-inrow/1925836 [https://perma.cc/4UWX-5AGT].
73. See, e.g., 7 of the Most Infamous Match Fixing Scandals That Shook World Football,
90 MIN (May 28, 2019), https://www.90min.com/posts/6378318-7-of-the-most-infamousmatch-fixing-scandals-that-shook-world-football [https://perma.cc/8K9J-BBGS]; Brian
Homewood, Brazilian Referee Admits that He Fixed Matches, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2005,
9:10
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2005/sep/30/newsstory.sport7
[https://perma.cc/3XEU-VZ7H].
74. Brian Homewood, Brazilian Referee Admits that He Fixed Matches, BBC (Sep. 29,
2005, 9:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2005/sep/30/newsstory.sport7
[https://perma.cc/Z39P-E6VL]; Turkey: Fenerbahce Boss Remanded on Match-Fix Charge,
BBC NEWS (July 10, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14100659
[https://perma.cc/5UKJ-AC5G].
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Olympiakos F.C., which engaged in “blackmailing and fraud” meant to “absolutely
control Greek football’s fate.”75
Along this line, cheating stems from national pride. At the 2012 Olympics, boxer
Satoshi Shimizu knocked down Magomed Abdulhamidov five times in one round—
which should have resulted in Shimizu’s victory—but instead of counting, the referee
commanded Abdulhamidov to rise.76 When the round ended, the judges declared that
the pummeled Abdulhamidov had won in an especially cynical instance of matchfixing.77 A report found that the World Series of Boxing received a $9 million wire
to deliver two Olympic gold medals to Abdulhamidov’s home country of
Azerbaijan.78 Similarly, during the 2002 Olympics, Russian organized crime figure
Alimzhan Tokhtahounov allegedly orchestrated a deal with French and Russian
officials in figure skating that induced the French judge to award winning scores to
the Russian team in pairs figure skating.79 The Russian judge returned the favor with
a gold medal to the French pair in ice dancing.80 Given this long history of cheating,
deception, and match fixing, the next Section explains why this is actually the
expected state of affairs.
B. The Impetus to Cheat
The leagues lack incentives to catch and expose cheating. Scholars describe it as
a catch-22 since leagues derive profit from intrigue—the NFL’s revenue combined
with its teams exceeded $14 billion in 2018—based on the perception that anything
may happen within a fair landscape.81 Beyond the direct revenue earned from ticket
sales and television, leagues encounter incentives to ignore cheating in order to guard

75. Graham Wood, Farcical Ending to Koriopolis Scandal, AGONA SPORT (Jan. 20,
2019), https://www.agonasport.com/agonasport-allnews/farcial-ending-to-koriopolis-scandal
[https://perma.cc/XRA8-63Y9].
76. Kelefa Sanneh, Fixing the Olympics? Azerbaijan’s Boxing Scandal, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/fixing-the-olympicsazerbaijans-boxing-scandal [https://perma.cc/E9XF-ZGFR].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 34, at 459–60.
80. See Oliver Burkeman, ‘Russian Mafia Kingpin’ Accused of Fixing Olympic Skating
Result, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2002, 8:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2002/aug/01/russia.sport [https://perma.cc/JP89-NPDB]. The 2002 figure skating
scandal would mark the first time that Olympic officials gave duplicate gold medals, awarding
the Canadian pair a gold medal after French judge, Marie Reine Le Gougne, acknowledged
the arrangement. Ironically, a Canadian pair lost out on a medal in the ice dancing competition,
finishing fourth after the Russian judge placed the French pair first. Id.
81. See Glenn Knowles, Keith Sherony & Mike Haupert, The Demand for Major League
Baseball: A Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis, 36 AM. ECONOMIST 72 (1992);
see also E. Woodrow Eckard, The Uncertainty-of-Outcome Hypothesis and the Industrial
Organization of Sports Leagues: Evidence from U.S. College Football, 18 J. SPORTS ECON.
298, 299 (2017) (explaining that the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis argues that sports fans
“value contests with uncertain outcomes,” and thus prefer that leagues be competitive as
opposed to dominated by a single team); Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 34, at 461 (“The
commercial viability of sport is at least somewhat dependent on the uncertainty of outcome.”).
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their ancillary industries worth billions of dollars, including video games, trading
cards, and apparel.82 By effect, the parties who often unearth scandals are Nevada
sportsbooks, inspiring observers to question whether leagues endeavor to protect
their games’ integrity or whether they hope to protect the appearance of integrity.83
Further, a league may actually have good reason to manipulate games in favor of
certain players or teams. Consider disgraced referee Tim Donaghy who provided
support for a longstanding rumor that the NBA employs certain referees to
manipulate important games.84 A well-known allegation is Game 6 of the 2002 series
between the Los Angeles Lakers and Sacramento Kings in which the NBA’s “fixer,”
referee Dick Bavetta, helped to extend the series to seven games after awarding the
Lakers twenty-seven free throws in the fourth quarter alone based on dubious foul
calls.85 The quality of the game’s officiating attracted the FBI’s attention.86
Perhaps no event better highlights the leagues’ misaligned incentives than the
1998 MLB season.87 After baseball’s popularity waned due to the players’ strike in
1994, it received a jolt of excitement from the home run explosion88—though rumors

82. See Terry Lefton, NFL: Another Record Year for Merchandise, N.Y. BUS. J. (Feb. 15,
2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/02/15/nfl-another-recordyear-for-merchandise.html [https://perma.cc/J8NZ-5QUQ] (noting that even in a year where
the NFL saw injuries shorten the season for several star players, various merchandisers saw
record years in terms of sales); Christina Gough, Total Revenue of All National Football
(Sep.
8,
2021),
League
Teams
from
2001
to
2020,
STATISTA
https://www.statista.com/statistics/193457/total-league-revenue-of-the-nfl-since-2005/
[https://perma.cc/9TJL-H7YJ]; TJ Mathewson, TV is Biggest Driver in Global Sport League
Revenue, GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://globalsportmatters.com/
business/2019/03/07/tv-is-biggest-driver-in-global-sport-league-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/C3KN-2PF7] (describing the revenues of various professional leagues).
83. See Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H.R. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong., 5–6 (2018) (testimony of Becky Harris, Chairwoman of the
Nevada Gaming Control Board) https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20180927/
108721/HHRG-115-JU08-Wstate-HarrisB-20180927.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JCP2-NJ3K]
(noting that Las Vegas sportsbooks and consultants identified suspicious betting involving
both Toledo football and basketball games and at Arizona State University).
84. John Marzulli, Ex-referee Tim Donaghy Blows Whistle on NBA Dirty Secrets, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (June 11, 2008, 11:31 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/basketball/
ex-referee-tim-donaghy-blows-whistle-nba-dirty-secrets-article-1.293192
[https://perma.cc/R53D-8G89].
85. See Greg Cote, Disgraced NBA Ref Opens Up About Game-Fixing Scandal, GUAM
DAILY POST (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.postguam.com/sports/nation/disgraced-nba-refopens-up-about-game-fixing-scandal/article_6d8df246-fa1d-11e9-bf9c-03f2ed4ba72b.html
[https://perma.cc/XAQ9-ZZGJ] (discussing an FBI investigation into the 2002 Western
Conference finals, which Bavetta refereed).
86. Chris Sheridan, Federal Agents Asking Questions About Bavetta, ESPN (June 12,
2008), https://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=3439554 [https://perma.cc/47WH-EWJS].
87. See Jaime Weinman, How Steroids Saved Baseball, MACLEAN’S (Feb. 23, 2009),
https://www.macleans.ca/general/how-steroids-saved-baseball/
[https://perma.cc/K3TB6EZM] (describing the excitement of increased home runs in baseball).
88. Joe Distelheim, The Year That Saved-and Stained-Baseball, HARDBALL TIMES (May
3, 2018), https://tht.fangraphs.com/the-year-that-saved-and-stained-baseball/ [https://
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swirled that the record setters were fueled by steroids.89 Due to evidence of cheating
among baseball’s leading hitters (and pitchers), MLB implemented a testing program
targeting only nonunionized minor league players in 2001.90 And this occurred only
after Congress took an interest in the scandal.91
Given this landscape, it may come as little surprise that aggrieved fans, spectators,
and gamblers have sought to sue leagues and teams. But it may come as a greater
surprise that the law has largely insulated the leagues from liability. This is despite
the sudden popularity of DFS and legalized sports gambling which, as we explain
next, has fundamentally altered sports.
II. GAMBLING AND DAILY FANTASY SPORTS
In the past few years, legalized sports gambling has not only grown exponentially
but also received a warm embrace from the professional sports leagues and their
respective teams.92 Whereas federal and state laws, as well as the leagues, had long
banned sports wagering due to its “immoral” qualities and potential to destabilize
sports,93 this landscape changed in the wake of Murphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association,94 which enabled states to legalize sports gambling.95 Murphy
not only propelled gambling’s popularity but also inspired the leagues to further
existing partnerships with DFS companies, like DraftKings and FanDuel, as well as
connect with bookmakers.96 Noteworthy is that despite the league’s modern
entanglement with legal wagering, rarely if ever have gamblers, spectators, or fans
redressed injuries caused by cheating or match fixing.97 This Part traces the legal

perma.cc/4KRP-PN25].
89. See Zachary D. Rymer, Full Timeline of MLB’s Failed Attempts to Rid the Game of
PEDs, BLEACHER REP. (June 10, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1667581-fulltimeline-of-mlbs-failed-attempts-to-rid-the-game-of-peds [https://perma.cc/466W-XETN].
90. Id.
91. Jeff Barker, Scandals Put the NFL in Congress’ Crosshairs, BALT. SUN (Sept. 21,
2014, 11:54 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-congress-nfl-tax-exempt20140919-story.html [https://perma.cc/GL88-KTJC].
92. Andrew Beaton & Katherine Sayre, The NFL Keeps Warming Up to Gambling, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2020, 3:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-nfl-keeps-warming-up-togambling-11582318648 [https://perma.cc/CK82-YWPC].
93. See Shaheen Borna & James Lowry, Gambling and Speculation, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 219,
222–23 (1987) (explaining the historical association between morality and gambling).
94. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); see Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & John T. Holden, Betting on
Education, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 465, 498–509 (2020) (noting that more than forty states introduced
or passed some form of legislation to legalize sports wagering within the first two years after
the Murphy decision).
95. For an overview of sports gambling regulation, see John T. Holden, Regulating Sports
Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575 (2020); see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 29.
96. David Purdum, Inside How Sports Betting Went Mainstream, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24310393/gambling-how-media-daily-fantasy-newthinking-us-pro-sports-commissioners-helped-sports-betting-become-accepted
[https://
perma.cc/U2QH-JZRD].
97. Despite efforts by some, most notably former New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman, to recover money for consumers from DFS companies who engaged in
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framework of sports betting in a historical setting, reviews the obstacles confronting
gamblers, fans, and spectators who endeavor to remedy cheating, and asserts the need
for reform in light of Olson.
A. The History of (Il)Legal Sports Gambling
The explosion of legal sports gambling is attributable to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Murphy in 2018, which opened the floodgates. Although prior to 1992
states wielded power to legalize sports betting, only a handful did—the most notable
being Nevada.98 Based on fears that gambling would destabilize sports, the
professional leagues and NCAA lobbied Congress to prevent states from authorizing
wagering on “their” games.99 This paid off with passage of the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).100 While PASPA lacked a per se ban, it

deceptive advertising, this money, even when recovered, appears to very rarely reach
consumers. See Joe Drape, New York Wants Fantasy Customers Repaid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/sports/revised-complaint-seeks-return-ofmoney-bet-on-fantasy-sports.html?searchResultPosition=11 [https://perma.cc/4STJ-73GA].
Both companies implicated in the Schneiderman’s complaints settled for $6 million each, but
it is unclear if any of that money was used to repay consumers. See Joe Drape, DraftKings and
FanDuel to Pay $6 Million Each to Settle New York Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/sports/draftkings-and-fanduel-to-pay-6-million-eachto-settle-new-york-claims.html [https://perma.cc/34LQ-KSH7]; Alexander F. Tilton, Mayer v.
Belichick: “Spygate” Scandal Is Not the Court’s Concern, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 341, 344–49
(2011) (describing historical efforts by fans and spectators to recover against sporting events
and teams following incidents that resulted in fans not receiving the sporting event they
expected).
98. Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case for
Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 163–64
(2010) (noting that Nevada operated casino-style gaming, whereas, Oregon and Delaware
operated National Football League lottery games, and Montana operated sports betting pools
on football and stock car racing).
99. See Eric Meer, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad
Bet for the States, 2 U. NEV. L.V. GAMING L.J. 281, 301 (2011) (describing sports league
efforts to ban sports wagering). The proposition that the sports leagues own the games, such
that they have a right to restrict what a third party can do with information generated from a
sporting event, is unsupported by the First Amendment or intellectual property law. See Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We believe that the
lack of caselaw is attributable to a general understanding that athletic events were, and are,
uncopyrightable. Indeed, prior to 1976, there was even doubt that broadcasts describing or
depicting such events, which have a far stronger case for copyrightability than the events
themselves, were entitled to copyright protection.”); see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Court
in Gionfriddo concluded that the ‘recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the
athletic performance of [players on Major League Baseball’s website] command a substantial
public interest, and, therefore, is a form of expression due substantial constitutional
protection.’ We find these views persuasive.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gionfriddo v.
Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001))); John T. Holden &
Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31 (2019).
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (1992).
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froze the sports gambling landscape in place as if it was 1992, forbidding states from
legalizing the activity if they had not already.101
But in 2011, New Jersey challenged PASPA by holding a nonbinding referendum
asking voters whether they supported sports wagering to prop up the state’s
struggling casinos and horse racing tracks.102 The ballot measure passed by a two-toone margin.103 Shortly afterwards, New Jersey enacted a bill allowing wagering on
professional and most college sports in a direct challenge to PASPA.104 But before
New Jersey could launch sports betting, the four major leagues and the NCAA sued
Governor Chris Christie to enforce PASPA.105 The district court entered a permanent
injunction in favor of the leagues,106 which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld.107
Undeterred, New Jersey returned in 2014 with a modified version of its bill.108
The leagues elected again to enforce PASPA but as the second lawsuit proceeded, a
notable shift had occurred in the acceptance of sports gambling animated by the
emergence of DFS.109 In 2018, when New Jersey petitioned the Supreme Court for
the second time,110 the Murphy Court held that PASPA unconstitutionally
commandeered states into maintaining their bans on sports gambling.111 Justice Alito
wrote that “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do
so, each State is free to act on its own.”112 In the first two years since Murphy, nearly
every state has introduced legislation to legalize a form of sports gambling—more
than twenty states have successfully done so.113 And as states legalize sports

101. John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting, 35
GA. STATE U. L. REV. 329, 330 (2019).
102. See MaryAnn Spoto, Sports Betting Backed by N.J. Voters, NJ.COM (Nov. 9, 2011,
2:10
AM),
https://www.nj.com/news/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin.html
[https://perma.cc/ZSQ3-L2TU].
103. See id.
104. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014).
105. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J. 2013);
28 U.S.C. § 3703 (1992) (“A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be
commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of
the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization
whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation.”).
106. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (holding “that PASPA is a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause. PASPA does
not violate the Tenth Amendment, Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Principles; nor
does it violate the Equal Footing Doctrine”).
107. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
108. See Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
109. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 495; John T. Holden, Christopher
M. McLeod & Marc Edelman, Regulatory Categorization and Arbitrage: How Daily Fantasy
Sports Companies Navigated Regulatory Categories Before and After Legalized Gambling,
57 AM. BUS. L.J. 113, 125–32 (2020) (describing the emergence of daily fantasy sports).
110. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty
Problem, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2017).
111. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).
112. Id. at 1484–85.
SPORTS
REP.,
113. See
Legislative
Tracker:
Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
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gambling, and as technology firms pioneer ways of capitalizing on this market, the
acceptance of sports gambling has evolved along with its offshoot, DFS.
B. The Rise of DFS and Legal Sports Wagering
DFS has substantially altered the tapestry of sports and gambling.114 While
gambling has played a role in U.S. culture predating the Revolutionary War—for
instance, horse racing has maintained a constant presence on the continent since the
mid-1600s115—most forms of gambling were considered taboo, immoral, and illegal
until relatively recently.116 Substantially altering this landscape is the rise of
DraftKings and FanDuel, which have sought to capitalize on America’s love for
fantasy sports.
To explain DFS, it originated from fantasy sports which date back to the 1920s as
a tabletop game by the Ethan Allen furniture company.117 The modern iteration of
fantasy sports, though, is associated with former New York Times editor Daniel
Okrent and his creation of the Rotisserie Baseball League.118 Fantasy sports were
historically contests played amongst friends where each participant would select realworld athletes to compose a fictional team.119 The teams would then compete against
each other in predetermined statistical categories.120 While early fantasy contests
were often more about the comradery than a prize, entry fees have long been
associated with the activity.121 Fantasy sports were perceived for decades as a
pastime for avid fans who, in many instances, enjoyed low-stakes gambling; after
all, it is common for a league’s victor to take the “pot.”122

https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/X6G7KFVX].
114. John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation in
Daily Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classification and Consumer
Implications, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2017).
115. Holden, supra note 95, at 596.
116. “Waves of legal gambling” is a phrase coined by gaming law scholar I. Nelson Rose,
who has documented three distinct periods (or waves) of gambling policy in the United States.
See generally I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361 (2010); Holden & Edelman, supra note 29, at 6.
117. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America
Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2012).
118. Okrent created the Rotisserie League after learning about a baseball simulation game
created by University of Michigan professor Bill Gamson. The Rotisserie League is named
after the former La Rotisserie Francaise restaurant where Okrent and friends would gather
each year and select their teams. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and
the Law: How America Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1,
4–7 (2012).
119. Id. at 7.
120. Id. at 7–8.
121. See id. (describing the first Rotisserie League—one of the first fantasy contests—as
having an entry fee of $260).
122. Id.
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This landscape inspired DraftKings and FanDuel to seize on fantasy sport’s
popularity, spawning a burgeoning DFS industry by 2014.123 No longer are fantasy
sports played primarily between close friends who convene for entire seasons, as
DFS has condensed seasons into a single day or even hours.124 Making DFS
especially salient beyond its scale—surpassing a billion dollars—is its intimate
relationship with sports leagues that had long rejected the threat of sports
wagering.125 Consider that each of the U.S. leagues have officially partnered with
DraftKings and FanDuel in hopes of capitalizing on the revenue flowing through
DFS markets. Emphasizing DFS’s effects on the business and culture of gambling,
scholars credit DFS’s popularity with helping to inspire a societal change of
consciousness about sports gambling resulting in Murphy.126
Today, DFS is neither a minor nor uncontroversial market. Not only have DFS
companies attracted hundreds of millions of dollars in outside investments—driven
by the $205.9 million spent on advertising in less than a year127—but also the
attention of state attorneys general (“AGs”) who have grown wary of DFS’s
similarities with illegal gambling.128 Despite the belief of some AGs that DFS
violates their state laws, DraftKings and FanDuel have suffered few long-term
consequences.129
Due to this momentum, the leagues have gone from partnering with DFS
companies to establishing formal ventures with sportsbooks—the very actors who
the leagues had long rejected.130 While some of these partnerships began when a
sportsbook was previously a DFS operator, it is notable that some leagues have taken
equity stakes in those companies.131 Both MLB and the NBA held equity positions

123. Fantasy sports were viewed as such a complimentary product for fans that the Major
League Baseball Players’ Association even lobbied Congress for them to be exempted from
federal anti-gambling legislation, while endorsing the statute more broadly. See John T.
Holden, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and the Exemption for Fantasy
Sports, 28 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 97, 104–05 (2018); Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal
Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016
U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 120–27 (2016).
124. Edelman, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. See Holden et al., supra note 109, at 125–35 (describing the rise of the DFS industry).
127. Ian Casselberry, DraftKings and FanDuel Have Spent $206 Million on Ads So Far
This Year, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (Oct. 10, 2015), https://awfulannouncing.com
/2015/draftkings-and-fanduel-have-spent-206-million-on-ads-so-far-this-year.html
[https://perma.cc/H2FY-P7Z4].
128. See Holden, supra note 95, at 585–87 (describing the response of various attorneys
general to DFS contests and finding that the contests violated state gambling laws).
129. DraftKings and FanDuel did agree to a settlement with the New York Attorney
General for $6 million each in association with claims that the companies had engaged in
deceptive advertising. See Holden et al., supra note 109, at 135.
130. See US Sportsbook and Casino Team Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting-deals/
[https://perma.cc/47MU-3U7C]
(listing partnership agreements between sports leagues and teams and various gambling
operators).
131. See, e.g., John Lombardo, NBA Signs Four-Year Deal with FanDuel that Includes
Equity Stake in Fantasy Company, SPORTS BUS. J. (Nov. 12, 2014),
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in DraftKings and FanDuel, respectively, with at least MLB maintaining their equity
through the transition from a DFS company to full-fledged sports betting operator.132
While some leagues have since divested themselves of ownership shares in gambling
operators,133 others like the NHL have sought to gain new equity stakes in growing
sport betting operators such as the Australian-founded PointsBet.134 Even where
leagues have not taken an ownership position in gambling operators themselves, the
NFL and several prominent league owners, like the Dallas Mavericks’ Mark Cuban,
have acquired stakes in gambling data providers.135 In fact, some teams may even
introduce their own sportsbooks from inside their stadiums.136
The point is that DFS reflects society’s new attitude about gambling in an era
without PASPA.137 However, no matter how deeply entwined the leagues become
with gambling, it is notable that they have largely insulated themselves from liability
even after instances of cheating. Given the rise of legal wagering and DFS, this
insulation may no longer make sense.
C. Aggrieved Fans and Gamblers, and Litigation
This Section explains the legal landscape in which gamblers and third parties
struggle to show reliance on cheating or privity to the event, depriving them of a
legal remedy. It then casts doubt on whether leagues like MLB and teams such as the
Astros should continue to enjoy de facto immunity for acts of cheating in light of
Olson.138 While Olson was unremarkable in its fidelity to precedent—it held that
third parties like aggrieved gamblers cannot show reliance or privity139—the novelty
is that this case sprung from users of DraftKings who could directly tie MLB’s
profitability to bets placed on compromised games. To explain the saliency of Olson,

https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Daily/Issues/2014/11/12/Marketing-andSponsorship/NBA-FanDuel.aspx [https://perma.cc/W4UJ-S82Z].
132. See Dustin Gouker, So Do NBA, MLB and NHL Now Own Parts of Gambling
Companies?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 24, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com
/20715/nba-mlb-nhl-relationship-with-fanduel-draftkings/ [https://perma.cc/MWT4-HP4A]
(noting the relationships between daily fantasy operators, turned gambling operators, and
professional sports leagues).
133. See Holden & Schuster, supra note 99, at 33 n.3.
134. See, e.g., NHL Takes Equity Stake in PointsBet in New Deal, NAT’L POST (Feb. 10,
2021), https://nationalpost.com/pmn/sports-pmn/nhl-takes-equity-stake-in-pointsbet-in-newdeal [https://perma.cc/U2KN-BH7U] (noting that the NHL acquired an equity stake in
gambling operator PointsBet).
135. Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Takes First Major Gambling Step with Sportradar Data
Deal, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Aug, 12, 2019, 10:10 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
onweb/nfl-takes-first-major-gambling-step-with-sportradar-data-deal
[https://perma.cc/
7DHW-P5WC].
136. See Chris Altruda, Texas Bill Would Allow Pro Teams to Be Licensed Sportsbook
Operators, SPORTS HANDLE (Feb. 23, 2021), https://sportshandle.com/texas-sports-bettingbill-ballot-question/ [https://perma.cc/32VZ-ZNAX] (noting a bill in the Texas legislature that
would allow professional sports teams in Texas to be licensed sports betting operators).
137. See Holden, supra note 95, at 587.
138. Olson v. Major League Baseball, 447 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
139. Id.
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the following discussion traces how leagues have long relied on arguments of privity
and reliance to evade liability from cases brought by fans and gamblers in the wake
of cheating, match-fixing, and similar scandals.
1. Reliance
To prove fraud and qualify for relief, the defrauded party must show that the
fraudster intentionally misrepresented or omitted some material fact and that the
defrauded party detrimentally relied on such mistruths or lies.140 This element poses
a significant problem for gamblers.
In Olson, discussed in the Introduction, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs
who had lost money wagering against the Astros—who were unaware of the team’s
cheating—lacked reliance on any affirmative statements by MLB promising
gamblers an environment free of cheating.141 Without such misstatements inducing
gamblers to bet on the Astros, the court held that the aggrieved gamblers’
presumption of a fair landscape was unwarranted.142
In a similar case, plaintiffs who lost money playing video gambling machines
while aboard a cruise ship sought to sue the gambling operator in a class action.143
The gambling machines were each based on a physical game such as poker—e.g.,
video poker—but the odds of winning on the video machines were worse than the
counterpart games; this defrauded the gamblers, as they claimed, because they
assumed the odds of winning equated to the actual game.144 The court rejected the

140. See generally Keenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(“Plaintiffs’ fraud claims are premised upon section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b–5
promulgated thereunder and upon common law fraud principles. A section 10(b) claim
consists of the following elements: (1) defendant’s misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) plaintiff’s detrimental reliance
upon the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission; (3) scienter, defined as the intent to
deceive, manipulative, or defraud; and (4) employment of the mails, an instrumentality or
interstate commerce, or a national securities exchange in furtherance of the fraud.”).
141. Olson, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (“A predicate of plaintiffs’ reliance theory is thus that
defendants made a misrepresentation about fantasy baseball itself, and the absence of such a
misrepresentation was thus important to the Court’s conclusion that the FAC did not, and could
not, allege the reliance necessary to support their fraud or negligent misrepresentation claims.
Manfred’s potential misrepresentation about the Yankees thus does nothing to resolve the
ultimate deficiency the Court found in plaintiffs’ initial complaint—a failure to allege a
misrepresentation about fantasy baseball that might render plausible their theory of reliance.”).
142. Id.
143. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 659–60 (“The Class Representatives’ central claim is that the Casinos have
engaged in ‘a course of fraudulent and misleading acts and omissions intended to induce
people to play their video poker and electronic slot machines based on a false belief concerning
how those machines actually operate, as well as the extent to which there is actually an
opportunity to win on any given play.’ They argue that the Casinos: ‘have encouraged the
public to perceive electronic gambling devices as true games of chance in which each
individual play of the game is subject to determinable odds of winning; that the odds are the
same on each individual play of the game; that the risk and the rules by which the machines
operate do not vary among individual plays of the game . . . .’”).
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class because the plaintiffs failed to show reliance: even though one might implicitly
assume fair odds, almost all of the plaintiffs had not actually relied on any specific
statements suggesting the odds presented a reasonable chance of winning.145
Notably, the plaintiffs sought to plead a theory based on reliance on prices, yet the
district court rejected this argument as existing exclusively in securities law.146
Furthermore, one of the world’s best poker players, Phil Ivey, lied to the Borgata
Casino that he required a certain type of cards and shuffling instrument due to his
superstitious nature. The items had actually enabled an edge-sorting scam.147 Ivey
won millions.148 The court rejected the Borgata’s claim in ruling that the casino was
unable to show reliance.149 Even though Ivey had deceived the Borgata, the Borgata
could have chosen whether or not to provide Ivey with the items—to the court, the
casino had not justifiably relied on Ivey’s statements. Akin to lack of reliance, lack
of privity has caused courts to dismiss lawsuits by third parties.
2. Privity
Before addressing gamblers, we consider how third parties have long struggled to
establish a legal relationship with cheating in sports due to a lack of privity.150 After
Mike Tyson was disqualified for infamously biting off a piece of Evander Holyfield’s
ear, boxing spectators sued for breach of contract because the fight had failed to end
in a knockout or decision.151 The New York court held, however, that the plaintiffs

145. Id. at 667–68 (finding no reliance).
146. See id. at 666 (“The shortcut of a presumption of reliance typically has been applied
in cases involving securities . . . . Although the Class Representatives urge us to follow the
analysis of these securities cases, their claims are best characterized as either affirmative
misrepresentations or ‘mixed claims’—claims that, in any event, would not be entitled to the
presumption.”).
147. Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, 216 F. Supp. 3d 426, 428 (D.N.J. 2016)
(describing the scheme).
148. Id. at 430.
149. Id. at 438–39 (“To meet the elements of fraud, Borgata must show that Ivey and Sun
made a material misrepresentation and that Borgata relied upon that misrepresentation to its
detriment. Ivey and Sun’s five specific requests to Borgata, and their instruction to the dealer
to turn the cards a certain way, did not violate any rules or regulations. Ivey and Sun did not
need to claim superstition to make their requests and card turning instructions permissible—
they already were. If Ivey and Sun had simply made their requests without explanation,
Borgata was still empowered to grant or deny those requests. That Borgata chose to believe
that Ivey and Sun were superstitions does not amount to detrimental reliance, when no
explanation at all could have resulted in the same course of events.” (footnote omitted)).
150. See, e.g., Castillo v. Tyson, 268 A.D.2d 336, 336–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting
the plaintiff sued after alleging they were deprived of a “legitimate heavyweight title fight.”);
see also Yoojung Rhee, Simon A. Brandon-Lai & John T. Holden, Aggrieved Fans, Consumer
Demand & Another Deflategate Lawsuit, SPORTS LITIG. ALERT (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://sportslitigationalert.com/aggrieved-fans-consumer-demand-another-deflategatelawsuit [https://perma.cc/8CTL-Q463] (describing the Castillo, Bowers, and Mayer cases).
151. See Brian A. Rosenblatt, I Know, It’s Only Rock and Roll, but Did They Like It?: An
Assessment of Causes of Action Concerning the Disappointment of Subjective Consumer
Expectations Within the Live Performance Industry, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 33, 47 (2005).
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were not in privity with the defendants, and that the rules of boxing allow for
disqualification such that a fan might reasonably expect it to occur.152 The New York
court further rejected the argument that plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries.153 A
disqualification is among the range of possibilities for a fight’s outcome, but the court
held that “there can be no breach of warranty claim absent privity of contract between
plaintiffs and defendants.”154
Courts have even denied recovery when leagues have acknowledged that teams
cheated.155 For example, fans initiated a failed lawsuit in 2016 against the NFL after
commissioner Roger Goodell concluded that the New England Patriots conspired to
use deflated footballs in violation of league rules.156 In another scandal involving the
Patriots, a season ticket holder of the New York Jets alleged nine claims springing
from a game in which the Patriots defeated the Jets after impermissibly videotaping
the Jets’ signals.157 The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals—while noting that it
did not condone the Patriots’ actions—rejected the plaintiff’s $61 million lawsuit
because the plaintiffs paid to see a game, which was sufficient to satisfy the contract
contained within a ticket.158 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, while the
case presented novel legal issues, the plaintiff received what he had paid for:
admission to a game.159 The complaint failed to “establish a cognizable right, interest,
or injury” that could have been provided by the justice system, since he had received
what he was entitled.160
Given the challenges of proving privity, it should be mentioned that aggrieved
gamblers have attempted to navigate around this obstacle by suing those who had
actually taken their money rather than the leagues. These lawsuits have notably
targeted operators of fantasy sports and DFS companies in hopes of recovering lost
bets or “entry fees.” But as this discussion explains, the law’s hostility to wagering
is neatly illustrated by gambling loss recovery statutes, which disgorge victorious
gamblers of their “winnings” (as opposed to entry fees) and repatriates the money
with the losing party. The purpose has historically been to discourage gambling,161

152. Castillo, 268 A.D.2d at 337.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See A.J. Perez, Federal Judge Calls Patriots Fans’ Deflategate Lawsuit ‘Plainly
Without Merit’, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/
patriots/2016/04/23/judge-calls-patriots-fans-deflategate-lawsuit-plainly-withoutmerit/83449852/ [https://perma.cc/2VUT-NJ9R] (noting a lawsuit seeking an injunction
against the NFL imposing a penalty against the New England Patriots for deflating footballs
was without merit).
156. Associated Press, Patriots Fans Sue NFL in Effort to Get First-Round Pick Back,
ESPN (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/15145235/new-england-patriotsfans-sue-nfl-get-back-first-round-pick-lost-deflategate [https://perma.cc/77QJ-FAJ6].
157. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 2010).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 230–31.
160. Id. at 232.
161. See generally Nick Chappell, State Laws on Ability to Recover Gambling Losses,
LET’S GAMBLE USA (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.letsgambleusa.com/state-laws-on-abilityto-recover-gambling-losses/ [https://perma.cc/S85Q-U6NB] (noting states that recognize the
right to recover gambling losses); see also Joseph Kelly, Caught in the Intersection Between
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as recovery statutes have assisted persons in avoiding their wagering losses as a
matter of public policy since at least 1710, when gambling was prohibited.162 But
since forty-eight states have legalized some form of gambling, gamblers will struggle
to cancel their debts.163
For example, in 2006, Charles Humphrey, a prominent lawyer and former
professional poker player, unsuccessfully sued Viacom, CBS, and ESPN, which
offered pay-to-play fantasy sports.164 The U.S. district court ruled that fantasy sports
leagues lack key elements of wagering under New Jersey’s statute, remarking that
entry fees and prizes were, rather than bets, tantamount to “bridge tournaments, local
and state rodeos or fair contests . . . literary or essay competitions . . . livestock,
poultry and produce exhibitions, track meets, spelling bees, beauty contests and the
like.”165
Humphrey would not reflect the last unsuccessful attempt of fantasy sports
losers.166 Fans sought recovery against FanDuel and Patrick Kaiser, who operated a
website that funneled users to FanDuel.167 The plaintiffs alleged, since the contests
entailed illegal gambling, that they were entitled to a remedy under Illinois’ gambling
loss recovery statute.168 Akin to the Humphrey court, the court held that FanDuel and
Kaiser were facilitators of the plaintiff’s gambling, but neither constituted winners
per se despite their commissions.169
In a notable development, rumors circulated in 2015 on message boards that
something akin to insider trading was occurring in DFS.170 As it turned out,

Public Policy and Practicality: A Survey of the Legal Treatment of Gambling-Related
Obligations in the United States, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 87, 87–88 (2002) (describing the Statute of
Anne, which allowed bettors to recover gambling losses).
162. Only Utah and Hawaii have no forms of legal gambling (including no lotteries). See
Beau Thompson, Internet Gambling, 2 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 82 (2001); Michael Martinez &
Kyung Lah, ‘I am Not a Sore Loser,’ Says Gambler Suing Vegas Casino After Losing $500K,
CNN (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/06/us/california-drunken-gambler-lasvegas-casino/index.html [https://perma.cc/REX9-W9ER] (noting the case of Mark A.
Johnston, a California resident, who incurred a $500,000 gambling debt in Las Vegas, which
he claims occurred after the casino served him so much alcohol that he was “blackout” drunk).
163. See Kelly, supra note 161, at 88 (noting that enforcement of gambling debts in the
United States occurs under three scenarios: (1) in-state enforcement when both the gambler
and creditor are in the same state, (2) sue in the state where the gaming facility is located and
seek enforcement in the sister-state where the gambler-debtor is located, or (3) sue the gambler
in the state they are domiciled).
164. Humphrey v. Viacom, No. 06–2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 1797648, at *4, *7 (D.N.J.
June 20, 2007) (noting that the complaint lacked ascertainable losers, and “the payment of an
entry fee to participate in a fantasy sports league is not wagering, betting or staking money”).
165. Id. at *7 (quoting State v. Am. Holiday Ass’n, 727 P.2d 807, 809, 812 (Ariz. 1986)).
166. See Jeffrey C. Meehan, The Predominate Goliath: Why Pay-to-Play Daily Fantasy
Sports are Games of Skill Under the Dominant Factor Test, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 5, 7
n.10 (2015) (citing to Langone v. Kaiser as a gambling loss recovery case involving DFS).
167. Langone v. Kaiser, No. 12 C 2073, 2013 WL 5567587, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013).
168. Id.
169. Id. at *6.
170. John T. Holden, Will F. Green & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and
Wire Fraud, 21 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8, 10 (2017).
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employees of FanDuel and DraftKings had—upon accessing their respective
company’s proprietary information—bet on each other’s sites and won significant
amounts.171 Despite the appearance of impropriety, a third-party review of a FanDuel
employee who won $350,000 found no evidence of wrongdoing, offering cover to
all parties.172 However, casting doubt on whether gamblers should continue to lack
redress is Olson.
3. The Importance of Olson
Olson represents the near-perfect illustration of the need to reconsider whether
gamblers deserve a remedy in light of modern developments.173 Kristopher Olson
sued MLB and the Houston Astros alleging that he and similar actors were
defrauded.174 The plaintiffs claimed that MLB’s ownership interest in DraftKings
kept it from rectifying cheating in order to protect MLB’s investment.175 To the
plaintiffs, so long as MLB profits from steering fans to gamble on baseball via DFS,
it should owe them a duty to provide a climate free of cheating. The court disagreed
with Mr. Olson based on settled case law, ruling that the leagues had no obligation
to gamblers.176
But in stark contrast to the long history of failed gambling lawsuits, Olson
represents a critical change in the wagering landscape. Rather than bets placed with
exogenous parties to the actual games, the plaintiffs could show that MLB had
directed them to gamble with MLB’s partner and subsidiary. As leagues ushered
their fans to gamble with their co-venturing DFS companies—a relationship that has
proven lucrative—we assert that leagues should no longer be able to claim injuries
arising from cheating are too attenuated.177 Perhaps the rise of DFS and legalized
sports wagering indicates that locking gamblers out of the courthouse as disinterested
third parties who lack reliance is no longer viable. The next Part shows how a

171. Jeb Lund, Daily Fantasy: You’re Screwed, Because You’re Supposed to Be, ROLLING
STONE (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:26 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-sports/dailyfantasy-youre-screwed-because-youre-supposed-to-be-41148/
[https://perma.cc/J3T3Q3DS].
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Dew-Becker v. Wu, No. 124472, 2020 IL 124472 (Ill. Apr. 16, 2020)
(holding that daily fantasy sports contests are games of skill—not gambling—and as a result,
Illinois gambling loss recovery statutes do not allow for recovery by those who lost playing
DFS.). The Dew-Becker decision effectively overrules an Illinois Attorney General opinion
from 2015, which argued that daily fantasy contests violated Illinois gambling laws. See John
Holden, Finally an End to Years of Madness in the Illinois DFS Saga, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/40106/illinois-dfs-case-draftkingsfanduel/ [https://perma.cc/9A8G-TBHT].
174. See Olson v. Major League Baseball, 447 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., US Sportsbook and Casino Team Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting-deals/
[https://perma.cc/DV5M-2GSL]
(noting the relationships between the sports gambling industry and professional sports leagues
and teams); see also Waters, supra note 11 (noting that the NHL has taken an equity position
in sportsbook operator PointsBet).
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mechanism meant to promote the integrity of securities trading would similarly
benefit gambling markets as well as most investable markets.
III. FRAUD ON THE GAMBLING MARKET
Using original empirical analysis, we support the doctrine of fraud-on-the-market
by showing its potential utility in gambling markets. Securities and sports markets
face a similar problem: third parties depend on fair play, yet insiders encounter
incentives to create informational asymmetries. Instead of self-correcting markets as
the law typically assumes, fraud in sports and securities markets alter the equity and
performance of both. But rather than characterizing investors as lacking in reliance
or too attenuated—as done historically in sports—fraud-on-the-market provides a
mechanism to redress duplicitous conduct in securities markets. In important part,
the doctrine transforms attenuated investors into victims who can show reliance.
Notably, though, the doctrine has endured volleys of criticisms from scholars and
jurists who contend that it fails to reflect reality and, in turn, no longer serves a
purpose.
Given the leagues’ relationship with gambling providers and DFS companies, as
well as their broader role within the gambling market, we argue that importing fraudon-the-market into the sports wagering market would not only remedy valid injuries
but also compel leagues to identify and punish cheating and deceit. In doing so, the
analysis shows that the fundamentals of fraud-on-the-market make sense for
securities litigation as well as most other investable markets. It demonstrates that
gamblers wagering on MLB games rely to their detriment on promises of fair and
static competition when important but subtle changes to the game have altered the
market such that prices do not reflect the true values of wagers.
A. The Vital Role of Information in Markets
Information is not only resilient but also the backbone of efficient markets.178 The
belief is that markets absorb information about a good’s value reflected by its
price.179 For instance, after millions of people buy and sell cars, the information
produced by the transactions influence prices whereby luxury cars cost more than
entry level cars. Even if some information is faulty, accurate information should
prevail in the aggregate.180
For example, in the stock market, information is expected to influence a stock’s
price almost immediately. If information sheds light on Company A’s success as well
as identifies Company Z’s failures, markets should quickly incorporate this
information as investors put more money into Company A while withdrawing it from
Company Z, altering each stock’s price.181 If one learns of a company’s merger or

178. See DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining the
value of information in securities markets).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)
(discussing how the exposure of information is supposed to affect market prices).
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new product via a television program, an investor who wishes to capitalize on this
information has already missed the boat.
The corollary is that market failure arises when consumers lack accurate
information. This can happen when parties engage in fraudulent conduct. For
instance, the classic “pump and dump” scheme occurs when a party encourages
investors to buy stock based on inaccurate news.182 But as shareholders buy the stock
and inflate its price, insiders sell their shares at the higher (inaccurate) price before
negative (accurate) news erodes the stock’s value back to its proper price. Here, the
firm has distorted the market with misleading statements, causing defrauded
individuals to misjudge the investment’s odds: they expected for the investment’s
value to exceed the purchase price, yet it becomes destined to fall below its
artificially high value.183 The incentive to introduce faulty information into the
market drives securities law, which mandates that firms must disclose certain
information while prohibiting types of false statements.184
Gambling markets suffer from the same frailties as other investable markets. For
instance, a betting line reflects the odds that a specific team will win by a certain
margin—if a line between two football teams is a “pick ‘em” where no one is
favored, both teams are expected to play with 50/50 odds of winning.185 But if players
throw a game, or if one team engages in wide-ranging cheating, the exposure of
private information (here, the cheating) would change the line, reflecting the actual
odds of the contest. We argue that, due to the similarity of market reaction, it makes
little sense to treat securities fraud as a specialized type of injury.
B. Fraud on the Sports Market.
Sports cheating is analogous to securities fraud because (1) gambling markets
encourage actors to compromise sports covertly and (2) the incentives to cheat
exceed the league’s incentives to catch and punish culprits. Consider that the goal of
match-fixing is to do so secretly in order to bet on private information; if everyone
knew of a scheme, the information would be reflected in betting line adjustments.
When gamblers wager on distorted lines (e.g., the act of betting on an ostensibly even
game where cheating has truly made the odds 1,000:1), this creates the same
informational asymmetries condemned by securities laws. But because actors in
sports markets lack a legal duty to disclose accurate information or forebear from
spreading false statements, gamblers tend to operate with less confidence in the
quality of sports markets relative to investing markets.
We argue that leagues can no longer claim that gamblers lack reliance. Whereas
teams and leagues had long rejected gambling, they have now struck lucrative

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The basic intent of
section 10(b) and rule 10b–5 and indeed, of the Exchange Act, is to protect investors and instill
confidence in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings.”).
185. See Danny Donahue, What Is a Pick ‘em in Sports Betting, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May
23,
2020),
https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/gambling/sns-actnet-sports-bettingdefinition-pickem-20200523-zkktthiedbgibervbpzgqke6aq-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2ZBT-2KNK] (describing the betting line value of a “pick ‘em”).
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partnerships with DFS companies in conjunction with the rise of legal sports
wagering. As leagues encourage fans to patronize their partnered DFS sites, they
have so formally entangled themselves with gambling providers and fans that their
claims of “too attenuated” can no longer stand. The problem is that fans will continue
to struggle to show detrimental reliance—after all, most fans and gamblers assume
that events are fair rather than relying on expressly misleading statements by
leagues—but this is precisely what securities law rectifies. Indeed, securities law has
developed a mechanism in the form of fraud-on-the-market, as explained next, for
investors to show detrimental reliance when they had historically been too attenuated
from the fraud or lacking in reliance.
C. Rule 10(b)
1. The Historical Challenges of Remedying Securities Fraud
Investors had traditionally struggled to remedy fraud due to the challenges of
proving detrimental reliance. Rule 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, while not
expressly meant to remedy fraud, enables the SEC to promulgate such a
mechanism.186 It prohibits “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”187 To support a
private action under 10(b), the Supreme Court cited the legislative record to find that
“[t]here cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and
dishonest practices of the marketplace thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”188 10(b)’s
backbone is thus common law fraud.
One who alleges securities fraud must demonstrate: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss causation, and (5) economic loss.”189
The crux is that investors are logically required to show reliance on the deceptive
comments to establish a fraud claim.190 Put simply, “[i]nvestors can recover damages
in a private securities fraud action only if they prove that they relied on the
defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company’s stock.”191
Actionable statements must exceed puffery, vague comments, or optimism, as the
defendant must have actually meant to espouse false or misleading statements that
investors would have considered salient.192

186. Loritz v. Exide Techs., No. 2:13–cv–2607–SVW–Ex., 2014 WL 4058752, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 7, 2014).
187. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
188. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230
(1988).
189. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005)).
190. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 263 (2014).
191. Id.
192. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 726 (1975) (alleging
misleading statements); Langevoort, supra note 29, at 978 (“Defendants commonly claim that
whatever was said, no matter how positive, was too general, speculative, or vague to be
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However, this framework had traditionally created a major hurdle for aggrieved
investors concerning the challenges of proving reliance. The solution to this problem
was fraud-on-the-market.
2. Fraud-on-the-Market
Claims of securities fraud had long failed because few investors knew of the
deceptive comments when investing or, better yet, invested because of the
statements. Rather, the typical investor purchases stock based on informal
associations with a company’s product, media reports, or third hand sources, but not
due to the company’s comments. Under a formal interpretation of fraud, this lack of
reliance would impede investors’ claims in almost all scenarios—that was until 1988
when Basic v. Levinson formalized the fraud-on-the-market theory.193
In the years leading up to Basic, some courts strayed from the common law of
fraud by loosening the plaintiff’s burden of showing reliance and causation.194 The
sea change came out of the Ninth Circuit in 1975 when it ruled in Blackie v. Barrack
that materiality was enough to show reliance.195 The Blackie court held that
misleading statements could create the presumption that investors were duped,
obviating the need to show actual reliance.196 Other circuit courts adopted Blackie in
that investors may depend on “the supposition that the market price is validly set and

anything more than ‘puffery,’ such that it was neither material nor misleading regardless of
what was left unsaid. The reasonable investor, these defendants argue, knows not to rely on
statements devoid of hard facts or concrete representations, and can read between the lines
well enough to know what is not being said; the investor would thus tread carefully rather than
assume that he has been told all that is important. Soft language, in other words, does not
matter at all.”).
193. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 226.
194. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 439 (1984) (“In
rule 10b-5 cases, courts initially required plaintiffs to establish, in addition to materiality, both
reliance and causation. These requirements were unquestionably appropriate and not
particularly burdensome when the violation resembled the common-law tort of deceit, as when
an individual sued on the basis of misrepresentations made to him in direct negotiations. The
decision of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., however, expanded the rule
10b-5 remedy to include misstatements contained in publicly available documents. Thus, the
rule 10b-5 claim was no longer directly analogous to the common-law tort.” (footnotes
omitted)).
195. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
196. Id. at 906 (“We think causation is adequately established in the impersonal stock
exchange context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, without
direct proof of reliance. Materiality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market
traders and hence the inflation in the stock price—when the purchase is made the causational
chain between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s loss is sufficiently established to make out
a prima facie case.”).
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that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price.”197 To advocates,
Blackie’s theory was necessary for rule 10b-5 to fulfill its purpose.198
The U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized securities litigation in 1988 by embracing
a version of fraud-on-the-market in Basic v. Levinson.199 Basic’s import was that one
can show reliance on misleading statements without actual reliance because
securities markets naturally absorb information into prices.200 In essence, deceptive
comments can distort a stock’s price from its efficient point by making the stock
appear better or worse than it is.201 Misleading statements about a firm’s performance
can thus alter the price of its stock.202 Since investors purchase stock based on price
signals, false information may presumably influence an investor’s behavior and
cause them to misperceive the investment’s true odds (e.g., whether the stock’s value
will increase over its purchase price).203 Based on fraud-on-the-market, investors can
show detrimental reliance despite never having come into contact with misleading

197. Id. at 907; The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1982)
(“The strongest support for a generalized fraud-on-the-market theory comes from the Ninth
Circuit . . . [i]n Blackie v. Barrack . . . .”); Black, supra note 194, at 454.
198. Michael A. Lynn, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 645 (1982) (“Justification for the theory must
therefore lie, if anywhere, in its service to the objectives of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5.
By enacting the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress intended to protect investors in the national
securities exchanges and to promote informed investment decision-making by requiring full
disclosure of material information in the issuance and trading of securities.”).
199. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
200. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The fraud on the market
theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price
of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business. Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. The misstatements may affect
the price of the stock, and thus defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of
the stock’s value. By artificially inflating the price of the stock, the misrepresentations defraud
purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock’s value. The causal connection
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less
significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations. In both cases, defendants’
fraudulent statements or omissions cause plaintiffs to purchase stock they would not have
purchased absent defendants’ misstatements and/or omissions.” (citation omitted)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246 (“The presumption is also supported by common sense
and probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”).
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information by relying on tainted prices.204 The Court reaffirmed fraud-on-themarket in the 2014 case Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.205
The consequence of fraud-on-the-market is substantial. Investors can now support
reliance without actually relying on anything.206 While the Supreme Court could
have strictly adhered to the common law of fraud, it chose to protect individuals who
were swindled by deception yet would have previously lacked a remedy under formal
theories of reliance. The promise of fraud-on-the-market is that the threat of liability
may discourage firms from misleading investors in the first place.207 That said, fraudon-the-market has incurred heavy criticism.
3. Does Fraud-on-the-Market Make Sense?
Fraud-on-the-market is beleaguered. As a leading article stated, fraud-on-themarket “just doesn’t work. At least that is the consensus view among academics
respecting the primary class action vehicle under the federal securities laws.”208 The
calls to end fraud-on-the-market came to a head in 2014 when the Supreme Court
reaffirmed it, though in a rather tepid show of support over several justices’
objection.
A prime source of contention involves whether stock prices absorb and reflect all
(public or material)209 information in prices—the “efficient markets hypothesis.”210

204. Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to
Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1313, 1336 (2018) (“[A]ll plaintiffs receive a presumption
of reliance, so long as they can show that the security they purchased traded in an
informationally efficient market. In this type of market, material statements—by definition—
move market prices, meaning that false or misleading ones will generally distort the price. The
presumption is thus referred to as the fraud-on-the-market presumption (the “FOTM
presumption”), as it is the misrepresentation’s impact on the market price that is held front and
center.” (footnotes omitted)).
205. 573 U.S. 258, 280 (2014).
206. Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 204, at 1337 (“But a natural consequence of this
doctrine is that once a lead plaintiff shows that the security traded in an efficient
market, any investor who bought at the inflated market price can join the class of aggrieved
individuals. And much of the universe of the investing community that buys stock during any
substantial period does so for reasons that have nothing to do to with the false or misleading
statement at issue. Instead, they are buying based on other information—or for extrainformational purposes altogether (such as mere portfolio accumulation or diversification
reasons). For that reason, nothing about the statement or price caused them to enter into the
transaction; they would have bought even if the misstatement had never been made—and even
if the price were far higher. But to the extent they have bought at an inflated price after a
corporate misstatement, they too can join the class.” (footnote omitted)).
207. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 110 (2017) (“The threat
of damages for such statements can deter corporations from issuing false statements in the first
place.”).
208. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 72 (2011) (footnote omitted).
209. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911 (1989) (discussing the importance of the efficient
market hypothesis to fraud-on-the-market’s viability).
210. Id.
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This theory is critical because, for fraud-on-the-market to operate, the market must
actually incorporate false or misleading statements into securities’ prices.211 The
issue with grounding any doctrine in the efficient markets hypothesis, critics argue,
is illustrated by stock market crashes and other forms of sudden and extreme
volatility: these events should not occur where individuals rationally invest in
markets reflecting all information about securities.212 Another scholar went further
and called fraud-on-the-market “junk science.”213 His point was that markets are
efficient in the aggregate but not necessarily with individual stocks, making it
misplaced to premise any doctrine on singular performances.214
Another problem is that misstatements might not move a market at all. If a market
is efficient, it would suggest that accurate information should likely prevail over
inaccurate information in correcting the market.215 So given the volatility of markets
as well as presence of unsophisticated investors, commentators assert that the
efficient markets hypothesis and fraud-on-the-market theory just do not pass the sniff
test.216
This brings us to 2014 when many observers believed that the Supreme Court
intended to put fraud-on-the-market out of its misery.217 Although it was affirmed,
Justice Roberts did so with modest approval. He essentially stated that Basic should
survive based on stare decisis as no real problems have come from the precedent.218
Another wing of the Court would have ended it: “Logic, economic realities, and our
subsequent jurisprudence have undermined the foundations of the Basic

211. Id.
212. Id. at 915 (explaining that the stock market crash may cast doubt on the efficient
market hypothesis).
213. J.B. Heaton, Kill Cammer: Securities Litigation Without Junk Science, 11 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 417, 420 (2020) (“Federal securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science
about market efficiency. It was not always so. It need not be the case going
forward. Securities litigation’s fraud on the market presumption ‘says that all traders who
purchase stock in an efficient market are presumed to have relied on the accuracy of a
company's public statements.’ Junk science entered securities litigation when courts applying
the fraud on the market presumption embraced the ad hoc speculations of a federal district
court in Cammer v. Bloom.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011))).
214. Id. at 457 (“While market efficiency remains the subject of ongoing research in
financial economics, it is crucial to acknowledge that financial economists virtually never test,
as litigants do, whether the pricing of a single stock is efficient.” (emphasis in original)).
215. Charles R. Korsmo, Market Efficiency and Fraud on the Market: The Danger of
Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 849 (2014) (“Likewise, not all misstatements
will move the market price even if the market is highly efficient.”).
216. Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis-an Inadequate
Justification for the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895, 902
(1992) (“Some of these criticisms rely on the idea ‘that market efficiency is implausible on the
basis of common sense experience.’” (quoting Robert Ferguson, An Efficient Stock Market?
Ridiculous!, 9 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 31, 31 (1983))).
217. Korsmo, supra note 215, at 858 (discussing the debates leading up to the ruling).
218. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274 (2014) (“Given that
possibility, we see no reason to exempt the Basic presumption from ordinary principles
of stare decisis.”).
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presumption, and stare decisis cannot prop up the façade that remains. Basic should
be overruled.”219
The point is that courts and scholars continue to debate the ongoing viability of
fraud-on-the-market and its underlying assumptions.220 While the Supreme Court
could have jettisoned it from securities litigation, fraud-on-the-market was
reaffirmed and thus remains good law, at least for the moment. We assert, however,
that fraud-on-the-market makes sense in most investable markets. Rather than
locking defrauded gamblers and other investors out of the courthouse, our empirical
research of sports markets finds evidence in support of fraud-on-the-market, which
we detail next.
D. Effects of Clandestine Changes on Betting Lines
We argue that cheating can threaten the integrity of gambling markets by creating
a market failure based on distorted information. In light of the similarities between
sports and securities markets, we propose a remedy: gamblers should be able to rely
on public information, such as each league’s rule books prohibiting cheating, to
support a fraud claim even if the investor or gambler has never come into contact
with this information. By incorporating fraud-on-the-market into sports markets, it
would recognize that acts of cheating and other deceptions affect betting lines, even
though gamblers act on false promises of fair play. After all, if teams and leagues
exposed their own cheating, it would change betting lines to reflect the information.
Given the parallels between gambling and investing—as well as the mirror incentives
to shroud wrongdoing—gamblers should be able to rely on the presumption of fraudon-the-market.
We show that duplicity creates informational injuries affecting betting markets—
in other words, gambling markets do not self-correct but instead gamblers depend on
faulty information to their detriment. When players, teams, and leagues cheat or
conceal scandals, gamblers rely on the errant betting lines as they place wagers. To
make this case, we analyze data from baseball’s gambling market to show how
surreptitious changes to MLB baseballs rendered a substantial impact on the
efficiency of prices in the totals wagering market. This altered the quality of
information to the detriment of gamblers. Due to the lack of information and then
misinformation regarding altered baseballs, the odds of a winning a bet on MLB
games had swung in a manner significantly altering the fortunes of bettors,
supporting reliance of fraud-on-the-market in sports markets or most other investable
markets.
1. The Empirical Question
Even small nudges to gameplay or equipment, can impact the value of bets placed
in sports gambling markets. Here, we use an example from MLB’s totals market to
exhibit the role of undisclosed or unknown changes that resulted in large swings in

219. Id. at 285 (Thomas, J., concurring).
220. See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 215, at 829 (questioning the continuing logic of the
fraud-on-the-market theory and the efficient market hypothesis).
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betting outcomes (MLB’s totals market is explained below). Purposeful and explicit
manipulation of games would likely result in far larger changes to the prices of
placing certain bets (asset prices) in the market.
It is now well-known, and reluctantly confirmed much later by MLB, that an
unspecified change to the flight of baseballs began in 2015 shortly after the
midseason All-Star Game (ASG). An MLB commissioned reported concluded in
2018 that the post-2015 ASG home run spike is
not due to either a livelier, ‘juiced’ ball, or any change in batter or pitcher
behavior, . . . . It seems, instead, to have arisen from a decrease in the
ball’s drag properties, which cause it to carry further than previously,
given the same set of initial conditions—exit velocity, launch and spray
angle, and spin. So there is indirect evidence that the ball has changed,
but we don’t yet know how.221
This apparent alteration resulted in a large increase in home runs and scoring that
was sustained and increased in subsequent seasons. Expert and media reports noted
this increase in suspecting changes to the baseballs themselves, during which MLB
only noted that baseballs were within (wide) specifications used for approval.222
Subsequent reports commissioned by MLB confirmed reductions in drag on
baseballs that started in the second half of 2015.223 Although specific manufacturing
changes were initially not linked to the reduction in drag, the proliferation of these
balls is consistent with the timing of manufacturing process improvements reported
by Rawlings, the manufacturer of official MLB baseballs.224

221. Dave Sheinin, MLB Finally Admits Changes to Ball Itself Fueled Home Run Spike,
(May
24,
2018),
But
Doesn’t
Say
How
or
Why,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/05/24/mlb-finally-admits-changesto-ball-itself-fueled-home-run-spike-but-doesnt-say-how-or-why/ [https://perma.cc/G45LQF8U].
222. Rob Arthur & Ben Lindbergh, A Baseball Mystery: The Home Run Is Back, and No
One Knows Why, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/abaseball-mystery-the-home-run-is-back-and-no-one-knows-why/
[https://perma.cc/2DY44W4F]; Rob Arthur, It Looks Like the Baseball Is Behind MLB’s Power Surge,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 17, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/it-looks-like-thebaseball-is-behind-mlbs-power-surge [https://perma.cc/ZTA8-FNA3]; Dr. Meredith Wills,
How One Tiny Change to the Baseball May Have Led to Both the Home Run Surge and the
Rise in Pitcher Blisters, ATHLETIC (June 6, 2018), https://theathletic.com/
381544/2018/06/06/how-one-tiny-change-to-the-baseball-may-have-led-to-both-the-homerun-surge-and-the-rise-in-pitcher-blisters/ [https://perma.cc/T2AB-FECG].
223. JIM ALBERT, JAY BARTROFF, ROGER BLANDFORD, DAN BROOKS, JOSH DERENSKI,
LARRY GOLDSTEIN, ANETTE (PEKO) HOSOI, GARY LORDEN, ALAN NATHAN & LLOYD SMITH,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE STUDYING HOME RUN RATES IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (2018),
http://www.insidesocal.com/dodgers/files/2021/10/Full-Report-of-the-Committee-StudyingHome-Run-Rates-in-Major-League-Baseball_052418.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A73D-WSVJ]
[hereinafter ALBERT ET AL., 2018 REPORT]; JIM ALBERT, ANETTE (PEKO) HOSOI, ALAN NATHAN
& LLOYD SMITH, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE STUDYING HOME RUN RATES IN
MLB (2019) (on file with authors) [hereinafter ALBERT ET AL., 2019 REPORT].
224. ALBERT ET AL., 2018 REPORT, supra note 223, at 49.
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The ball’s alteration paired with cagey responses regarding increases in home runs
from MLB225 distorted gambling markets. Consider a “Totals” bet which involves
the total amount of runs scored in a game by both teams combined—e.g., if the line
in a Totals bet is eleven, then any combination of runs by both teams surpassing
eleven runs would make a winner of those who bet the “Over” and a loser out of
those who bet the “Under.” Although Totals markets tend to be relatively efficient—
shading toward the Over due to betting volumes on that side—we show that
unexpected changes to MLB’s baseballs resulted in extreme changes in betting
outcomes. For years, a strategy of betting on the Under for every game would have
made the gambler a net winner until the baseballs changed; at that point, the new
flight path of MLB balls flipped the script and turned a religious Over betting strategy
into the best approach. In important part, gamblers did not adjust their betting
strategy for the sudden turn in fortunes. They instead relied on cagey statements by
MLB about how nothing had changed. In this sense, misstatements distorted
gambling lines on which gamblers relied to their detriment.
We exhibit this in two ways. First, we show the clear change in rates of successful
bets on Overs in all Totals bets before and after the ball change. Secondly, we
reproduce a recently published betting strategy pairing umpire information with bet
prices to make successful bets from 2009 to 2014,226 and extend this to 2015. For all
years, and in both exhibitions, we split each year’s betting data into two periods of
pre- and post-ASG to create comparable sets of data in each year as they relate to
returns in the betting market and timing of apparent alterations to the baseball.
Results show considerable changes to values of bets that are not reflected in bet
prices that would be inferred from historical data.
2. Data
Betting data come from the website Sports Insights227 and consist of all regular
season games from 2009 through 2015. The data include game results, total runs
scored, and an average totals line and price across a number of providers.228 For
various reasons, some MLB games do not have betting lines, and therefore the data
do not include all games. We also remove doubleheader games from the data due to
complications with identification of series game order.229 This leaves 16,634 games
within the data set that are tied to Totals lines.
For the replication approach, we use data from MLB’s pitch tracking technology
PITCHf/x (now referred to as Statcast)230 to model individual umpire strike zones
with a spatial regression model. These data include every regular season pitch thrown
since 2008 paired with their respective location as the pitch crosses home plate and

225. Kaplan, supra note 30.
226. Brian M. Mills & Steven Salaga, A Natural Experiment for Efficient Markets:
Information Quality and Influential Agents, 40 J. FIN. MKTS. 23 (2018).
227. SPORTSINSIGHTS, www.sportsinsights.com [https://perma.cc/8U88-CREP].
228. We note that a large portion of bets placed at these sites were likely to be illegal at the
time under most state laws.
229. Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, at 29.
230. Baseball Savant, MLB, https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/ [https://perma.cc/CUV7VKWQ].

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 285

2/25/22 10:24 AM

694

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:659

call made by the umpire.231 Because umpire tendencies are aggregated over the prior
season or half season at the pitch level, games featuring umpires that have not worked
behind home plate during that time are removed from the possible bets. Finally, due
to limited public knowledge regarding umpire assignments, the first game of a
regular season series is not included in the group of possible games for the replicated
betting strategy. This reduces the number of games available for bets to 11,372.232
3. Betting Simulation
Betting All Overs or Unders: Our first test assesses whether gamblers were likely
harmed by the concealment of private information about MLB’s baseballs when they
relied on sticker prices in wagering markets. We begin by aggregating success rates
and payouts from betting only on Overs or only on Unders for all games in the sample
from 2009 through 2015. These are aggregated overall by season and for pre- and
post-ASG splits. Evaluating success rates on Overs (Unders) is as simple as
calculating the percentage of wins out of all bets placed, removing any push
outcomes from the data.233 If the total combined runs in a given game exceed the
Totals line, then the Over bet is considered a win. If fewer runs are scored in the
game, then the Under bet is considered a win.
For our payout calculations, or the amount a bettor wins or loses, we use a baseline
bet of $100. Here, if the price is positive (e.g., +110),234 our bet amount is $100. The
payout for this bet, if it is successful, will be $210, resulting in $110 in profit for the
bet. An unsuccessful bet results in a loss of $100. However, if the price is negative,
we place a bet equal to the absolute value of the price. As an example, if the price is
-115, then we place a bet of $115. A successful bet in this case pays $215, resulting
in $100 profit. An unsuccessful bet results in the loss of $115. As with the success
rates above, these are aggregated overall at the seasonal level and at the pre- and
post-ASG level. We calculate win rates and payouts for both Overs and Unders.
Although win rates are symmetrical, payouts are not, due to unbalanced prices on
each bet option.

231. In total, there are nearly 5.7 million pitches in the data set, with nearly 3.6 million of
those requiring the home plate umpire to make a ball or strike call. Furthermore, pitches not
requiring judgment from the umpire—such as pitchouts—were removed from this data when
modeling umpire strike zone tendencies.
232. Although umpire assignments are unknown in the first game of a regular season
series—and therefore information about umpires cannot be leveraged in placing bets for these
games—subsequent games in the series have a known rotation and assignment information for
the remaining games in the series is thus revealed fully at the start of the first game.
233. Pushes refer to bets in which the posted total is reached exactly. For example, if the
total line is nine runs, and both teams score exactly nine runs combined, then money is returned
to all bettors.
234. A wager placed at a line of +110 means that if a bettor places a $100 bet and wins,
the bettor will receive $110 plus their wager of $100 for a total of $210. If the line was instead
-110, a bettor would need to wager $110 to win $100 dollars. See generally, What is a
https://www.thelines.com/betting/moneyline/
Moneyline
Bet?,
LINES,
[https://perma.cc/UWG2-EUVE].
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Betting Based on Umpire Tendencies: In reproducing the betting strategy using
umpire information, we apply the same approach to aggregation and payout
calculations as with the blanket Over and Under bets placed above. We use a moving
average of the home plate umpire game-average tendencies—aggregated from the
ninety-day average pitch deviation from the spatial regression model—over the
immediately preceding 180 days. We place bets on games only when umpire identity
is known prior to the start of the game (i.e., games after the first game of a series).
Decision rules are as follows: If an umpire’s game-level favorability toward pitchers
appears in the 95th percentile or above among his peers over the last 180 days,235 we
place a bet on the Under.236 If an umpire’s favorability toward batters appears in the
95th percentile or above among his peers over the last 180 days, we place a bet on
the Over. This necessarily reduces the number of bets made relative to the Over and
Under blanket strategy and identifies a total of 961 potentially favorable bets from
mid-2009 through 2015. Of these bets, 543 would be placed as Under bets, while 418
would be placed as Over bets.
4. Results of Betting Simulation
Results of Betting All Overs or Unders: We first note that, due to betting volume,
Totals lines set by oddsmakers tend to be asymmetrically set in ways that have
historically been more favorable to betting Unders in general. In our betting
simulation across the entire sample and in most years, Unders win more than 50% of
bets (excluding push outcomes).237 These results are presented in Table 1 and Table
2.
We turn to the exhibition of success rates and returns in the pre- and post-ASG
periods across seasons in Table 1 and Table 2. In nearly every half season split,
betting Overs resulted in significant losses. The two exceptions are 2011 and 2015,
when both seasons’ second halves experienced unusually high Over-bet win rates.
We focus on 2015, as the swing in return was larger, and explanations for 2011’s
similarity are unclear.238 As we explain in short order, the change to ball flight

235. The MLB season is roughly 180 days long, resulting in the use of approximately one
season’s worth of umpired games for each measurement.
236. Although it turns out that it would be profitable on Under bets to use any game
featuring an umpire more favorable to pitchers than an average umpire, we restrict our
exposition to a direct replication of this work.
237. Due to bet prices, betting Unders across the board is not profitable (despite winning
more than 50% of the time) but does not result in losses as large as betting all Overs. Further,
when placing a bet, the bookmaker charges a commission, called the vigorish, or juice.
Because of this built-in cost, a bettor actually needs to succeed at wagering at greater than a
50% rate in order to be profitable. Where so-called standard odds of -110 are used, a bettor
would need to win 52.4% of their bets to be profitable. See What is Vig and How Does It
Work?, PLAY COLO., https://www.playcolorado.com/sports-betting/what-is-the-vigorish/
[https://perma.cc/A6NQ-KPUX].
238. However, both runs and home runs spiked in the second half of 2011, which was
sustained through much of 2012 as well. Betting markets likely adjusted to this change in
2012, but clearly did not do so in 2011. It seems likely that there was some other unknown
change to gameplay during this time, though we leave analysis of this period to further
investigation.
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increased home runs and run scoring dramatically, which was not properly
integrated into the betting market. The result was an increase in the post-ASG
success rate on Over bets from 48.1% from 2009 to 2014, to a 53.0% success rate in
2015.239

239. A chi-square test confirms the difference between the post-ASG period in 2015 was
statistically significantly different than from 2009 to 2014 combined. Because pushes are
removed from the data, changes to Under bets are perfectly inverse of the results for Overs, as
shown in Table 2.
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Table 1 – Success Rates and Payouts for Regular Season Games (Overs Only)
Pre-ASG
Year

Bets

Post-ASG
Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

2009

1,247

47.0

2010

1,244

2011

Overall

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

Avg.
Payout
($)

- 8.22

1,022

47.5

- 6.84

2,269

47.2

- 7.60

49.4

- 2.80

1,038

47.8

- 6.78

2,282

48.7

- 4.61

1,263

50.0

- 1.98

972

52.9

+ 3.16

2,235

51.3

+ 0.25

2012

1,217

49.2

- 3.21

1,061

47.8

- 6.61

2,278

48.6

- 4.79

2013

1,325

49.8

- 2.44

943

45.9

- 10.84

2,268

48.2

- 5.93

2014

1,324

50.1

- 1.99

937

46.7

- 7.75

2,261

48.7

- 4.38

20092014

7,620

49.3

- 3.41

5,973

48.1

- 5.94

13,593

48.8

- 4.52

2015

1,235

49.4

- 3.63

1,010

53.0

+ 4.05

2,245

51.0

- 0.17

All

8,855

49.3

- 3.44

6,983

48.8

- 4.49

15,838

49.1

- 3.91

*Number of bets, average payouts, and win rates exclude push outcomes. Win rates and net
payouts calculated using closing totals and moneyline values. Bets are scaled in the same way
as Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, using a $100 baseline bet, adjusted by the moneyline value.
The average simulated bet was $108.29 from 2009 to 2015.
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Table 2 – Success Rates and Payouts for Regular Season Games (Unders Only)
Pre-ASG
Year

Bets

Post-ASG

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

2009

1,247

53.0

2010

1,244

2011

Overall

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

Avg.
Payout
($)

+ 3.48

1,022

52.5

+ 2.14

2,269

52.8

+ 2.88

50.6

- 2.26

1,038

52.2

+ 1.73

2,282

51.3

- 0.44

1,263

50.0

- 3.08

972

47.1

- 8.61

2,235

48.7

- 5.48

2012

1,217

50.8

- 1.95

1,061

52.2

+ 1.12

2,278

51.5

- 0.51

2013

1,325

50.2

- 2.82

943

54.1

+ 5.70

2,268

51.8

+ 0.73

2014

1,324

49.9

- 3.54

937

53.3

+ 2.52

2,261

51.3

- 1.03

20092014

7,620

50.7

- 1.40

5,973

51.9

+ 1.41

13,593

51.2

- 0.16

2015

1,235

50.6

- 1.63

1,010

47.0

- 9.53

2,245

49.0

- 5.18

All

8,855

50.7

- 1.42

6,983

51.2

- 0.15

15,838

50.9

- 0.86

*Number of bets, average payouts, and win rates exclude push outcomes. Win rates and net
payouts calculated using closing totals and moneyline values. Bets are scaled in the same way
as Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, using a $100 baseline bet, adjusted by the moneyline value.
The average simulated bet was $108.29 from 2009 to 2015.

Consider the manner in which concealed information about changes in baseballs
transformed the betting market in 2015. Over bets during the pre-ASG period lost
$3.63 per bet, while in the post-ASG period won $4.05 per bet. This swing amounts
to $7.68 per bet, nearly 50% higher than the only other similar swing in 2011.
Interestingly, across-the-board Under bets were profitable in most seasons in the
post-ASG period, with the same 2011 and 2015 exceptions. From 2009 to 2014, the
average return for betting the Under in the post-ASG period was $1.41, while in
2015, each bet resulted in a loss of $9.53. This was remarkable enough to turn the
return for the entire post-ASG period sample from 2009 to 2015 negative. In essence,
gambling lines failed to incorporate the concealed information.
Results of Betting on Umpire Tendencies: Although betting only Overs or Unders
helps to make clear that a bet’s value may lack private information reflected in prices
after the ball change, this is a generally unprofitable strategy for bettors in the first
place. To strengthen these results, we replicated the successful betting strategy from
Mills and Salaga to show similar mispricing in the market after the change to the
ball. Results from these betting simulations are found in Table 3 and Table 4. This
previous work was largely focused on the success of integrating umpire strike zone
tendency information when betting Unders, and we therefore focus most closely on
Table 4.
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Table 3 – Reproducing Mills & Salaga (2018) Umpire Strategy Through 2015
(Overs Only)
Pre-ASG
Bets

Post-ASG

Year

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

2009

4

50.0

- 5.00

18

77.8

+ 54.72

22

72.7

+ 43.86

2010

16

43.8

- 7.40

40

47.5

- 14.81

56

46.4

- 12.69

2011

34

55.9

+ 8.94

29

62.1

+ 22.24

63

58.7

+ 15.06

2012

42

50.0

- 3.12

18

50.0

- 0.72

60

50.0

- 2.40

2013

35

48.6

- 4.97

39

43.6

- 17.97

74

46.0

- 11.82

2014

18

27.8

- 49.61

16

50.0

- 3.69

34

38.2

- 28.00

20092014

149

47.7

- 7.72

160

53.1

+ 3.51

309

50.5

- 1.91

2015

46

52.2

+ 0.00

40

50.0

- 0.55

86

51.2

- 0.26

195

48.7

- 5.90

200

52.5

+ 2.70

395

50.6

- 1.55

All

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

Overalla

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

Avg.
Payout
($)

*Number of bets, average payouts, and win rates exclude push outcomes. Win rates and net
payouts calculated using closing totals and moneyline values. Bets are scaled in the same way
as Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, using a $100 baseline bet, adjusted by the moneyline value.
The average simulated bet was $108.29 from 2009 to 2015. In 2009, only a partial season was
available for the betting strategy from Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, due to the need for
previous umpire data to meet the threshold for betting. Therefore, most bets take place after
the halfway point in the 2009 season.
a
We note that due to small changes in data cleaning and availability, our precise payout
numbers differ slightly from those in Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, at 37 tbl. 8, col. 4, though
not in any substantive way.
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Table 4 – Reproducing Mills & Salaga (2018) Umpire Strategy Through 2015
(Unders Only)
Pre-ASG
Bets

Post-ASG

Year

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

2009

5

100.0

+ 104.2

19

57.9

+ 13.42

24

66.7

+ 32.33

2010

76

63.2

+ 24.33

38

50.0

- 2.34

114

58.8

+ 15.44

2011

42

66.7

+ 32.21

40

47.5

- 8.03

82

57.3

+ 12.59

2012

46

63.0

+ 22.98

49

55.1

+ 7.45

95

59.0

+ 14.97

2013

24

50.0

- 6.42

10

60.0

+ 18.90

34

52.9

+ 1.03

2014

67

56.7

+ 11.33

22

63.6

+ 25.59

89

58.4

+ 14.85

20092014

260

61.5

+ 20.71

178

53.9

+ 5.40

438

58.5

+ 14.49

2015

43

53.5

+ 3.58

28

39.3

- 27.46

71

47.9

- 8.66

303

60.4

+ 18.75

206

51.9

+ 0.94

509

57.0

+ 11.26

All

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

Overalla

Avg.
Payout
($)

Bets

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

(N)

Win
Rate
(%)

Avg.
Payout
($)

*Number of bets, average payouts, and win rates exclude push outcomes. Win rates and net
payouts calculated using closing totals and moneyline values. Bets are scaled in the same way
as Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, using a $100 baseline bet, adjusted by the moneyline value.
The average simulated bet was $108.29 from 2009 to 2015. In 2009, only a partial season was
available for the betting strategy from Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, due to the need for
previous umpire data to meet the threshold for betting. Therefore, most bets take place after
the halfway point in the 2009 season.
a
We note that due to small changes in data cleaning and availability, our precise payout
numbers differ slightly from those in Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, at 37 tbl. 8, col. 4, though
not in any substantive way.

We first reproduce returns from past work, showing that from 2009 through 2014,
this strategy resulted in over 700 potentially favorable bets, with 438 of these being
Under bets. The overall return per Under bet during this period was $14.49, a return
of about 13.4% per wager.240 In every season during this period, identified Under
bets were profitable. However, in the 2015 season, the average loss per bet was $8.66.
This change is even more stark when comparing the pre-ASG and post-ASG periods
in 2015. In the pre-ASG period, Under bets returned $3.58, while there was a loss of
$27.46 per bet in the post-ASG period, a negative swing in returns of $31.04 per

240. The average bet overall in the data was $108.29 based on the closing price. We note
that due to small changes in data cleaning and availability, our precise payout numbers differ
slightly from those in Mills & Salaga, supra note 226, at 37 tbl. 8, col. 4, though not in any
substantive way.
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bet.241 The aggregate losses in this post-ASG period in 2015 were 36% larger than
the combined total of all other half-seasons that resulted in losses on Under bets with
this betting strategy.242
Although Over bets were generally not profitable when leveraging umpire strike
zone information, it is possible that placing Over bets identified as potentially
favorable during this period may have negated some losses from the large change to
profitability of umpire-favorable Unders. Indeed, while there was a shift toward more
successes on Overs than in other seasons (Table 3), the shift was not strong enough
to provide profitable bets when pairing hitter-friendly umpires with Over bets. These
bets still lost $0.55 per bet overall in 2015, and per-bet losses for all Over and Under
bets in 2015 were $4.06, compared to gains of $7.71 per bet from 2009 to 2014.243
In sum, even small changes to gameplay (in this case, the ball) seem to have clear
effects on the market and the accuracy of pricing for bets.
1. Discussion
The analysis demonstrates that market actors depend on price signals even when
private information has distorted those lines or prices. In the gambling market,
changes in MLB’s ball boosted scoring to the degree that a winning or losing
wagering strategy flipped. It seems that MLB’s statements led gamblers to presume
a static gambling environment. Even though many gamblers were unaware of MLB’s
statements, comments suggesting that the balls had remained unaltered froze the
gambling lines in place even though the odds had actually changed. In this sense,
many gamblers who had bet on Unders in Totals markets had relied on the lines to
their detriment. The point is that the impact of misstatements in MLB wagering
provides support for fraud-on-the-market in the gambling market and other
investable markets like the conventional securities context. Indeed, similar to how
fraud is theorized to affect securities prices on which investors rely, we find this
relationship in the gambling market.
D. The Remedy
Attentive readers might question whether the professional leagues have actually
made the types of statements, or engaged in the types of acts, enabling gamblers to
claim justifiable reliance on a fair landscape. When a team cheats, should this be
considered a breach of the league’s duty to detect and prevent duplicitous conduct?
With securities fraud—like other types of fraud—an aggrieved investor must show
false or misleading statements upon which investors have detrimentally relied in the
form of distorted prices. After all, for fraud to affect stock prices, the fraudster must
have actually made the types of material comments affecting market prices.
Given the above evidence that cheating affects betting lines, we find it
problematic that gamblers cannot establish detrimental reliance on fraud. To this end,
rarely, if ever, have gamblers relied on misstatements relating specifically to the

241. See infra Table 4.
242. See infra Table 4.
243. See infra Tables 3 & 4.
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fraud. We assert next that gamblers are owed a fair betting landscape, which the
leagues establish by publishing and following official rulebooks; the implication is
that the games are fair. Because this type of evidence is currently insufficient, our
research shows that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine should create the presumption
of detrimental reliance. In fact, concealed changes in the game did affect the odds of
winning to the detriment of gamblers.
Further, we find evidence of the leagues, teams, and gambling operators asserting
the fairness of their games. The first source comes from the joint ventures between
leagues and DFS companies. For instance, DraftKings makes the affirmative
statement that “[w]e do everything we can to make the game fair . . . .”244 They also
claim that regulations of wagering under New Jersey law provides gamblers with a
“fair” landscape in which to bet.245 FanDuel, likewise, expressed its “commit[ment]
to making FanDuel a more fair and level playing field[,]”246 exclaiming that “it’s
always a fair matchup.”247
Navigating away from gambling and DFS operators to the leagues themselves,
each league enforces a rule book that establishes the parameters of fair play and
attendant punishments.248 By detailing the requirements of how teams must compete
on and off the field and making affirmative comments claiming the fairness of their
games,249 the leagues and operators provide sufficient acts and statements allowing
gamblers to expect fair play—or at least enforcement of their rules. In other words,
as the leagues establish lucrative relationships with companies like FanDuel and
DraftKings through which they usher their fans to these gaming operators, such a
joint venture mixed with affirmative statements and implicit promises made in the
rule books gives gamblers a justifiable reliance on fair play.250 We also theorize that
amending the laws to promote the rights of gamblers would enhance sports integrity
by incentivizing the leagues to maintain a fair and competitive landscape.
In short, an objective goal of this Article is to recognize key similarities between
investors and gamblers so harms remedied by securities law may also be remedied
in the sports gambling market. We assert that those who bet on platforms like
FanDuel or DraftKings deserve recourse when cheating causes them losses, given

244. Meet Our Regulators, DRAFTKINGS.COM, https://www.draftkings.com/communityguidelines [https://perma.cc/K983-8CBP].
https://casino.draftkings.com/?page=1
245. Football,
DRAFTKINGS.COM,
[https://perma.cc/4N9F-XCNN] (click “How To Play”; click “Learn More”) (“We are
regulated by the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement as an [i]nternet gaming operator
in accordance with the Casino Control Act N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 and its implementing regulations.
Our games are tested by the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement to provide games
that are fair and operate correctly.”).
https://www.fanduel.com/no-pros-zone
246. No-Pros
Zone,
FANDUEL.COM,
[https://perma.cc/L562-GXVL].
247. Why FanDuel?, FANDUEL.COM, https://www.fanduel.com.
248. See, e.g., OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2019), https://operations.nfl.com/media/3831/2019-playing-rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4F7-Q3NQ].
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Major League Baseball and FanDuel Strike Sports Betting Deal, CNBC
(Aug. 15, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/15/major-league-baseball-andfanduel-strike-sports-betting-deal.html [https://perma.cc/LV2P-TVAA].
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the depth of operators’ relationships with the leagues. So long as the leagues have
sought to profit from DFS and the gambling industry by funneling their fans to
operators for the sake of wagering, this creates a bond with gamblers that had not
existed previously.
A chief advantage of this approach is that it would enhance the integrity of sports.
If leagues lack incentives to identify and punish cheating, the costs arising from
gambler lawsuits would reverse this course. In the Astros example, the leagues would
have likely taken a more proactive approach in investigating and preventing sign
stealing if the leagues feared that DFS players and gamblers could allege a fraud-onthe-market lawsuit. This would generate costs that currently do not exist to promote
the integrity of sports. Today, after all, the Astros profited from the cheating,
considering the extent to which the benefits of winning the World Series exceeded
the nominal punishments.
While there has been a great deal of academic effort spent on advocating for a
rollback of the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities markets, the theory actually
appears well-suited to be expanded to protect consumers in other industries. The
presumption of bettors is like that of investors: they are not playing a rigged game.
Since the establishment of securities laws in the first part of the twentieth century,
investors have had the benefit of corporate disclosures and legal protections from
acts that might undermine the integrity of the market. Bettors, by contrast, have
virtually nothing that guarantees the underlying sporting events are legitimate,
despite the fact that the sports leagues are now active partners in promoting wagering.
The disconnect between the protections of these two markets can no longer be
justified by arguing that sports betting is a moral vice and should not be encouraged.
E. Implications
Additional areas known for investment where fraud may manipulate prices
without one’s direct knowledge of misstatements include the art and cryptocurrency
markets. In both instances, investors purchase assets with a degree of reliance on the
good’s price. When the asset’s price is influenced by fraud to the investor’s
detriment, fraud-on-the-market would likely make sense as it would in the sports
gambling market.
1. Art Market
A significant area where actors can manipulate market prices via porous
information is the art market. Art’s price is substantially affected by its provenance
as well as authenticity: a fake or stolen work is virtually worthless.251 A problem
facing art dealers is that if information escapes about whether an artwork is stolen or
faked, it can devastate the work’s value.252 This has led dealers and auction houses
to engage authenticators in secret in case the expert declares the work to be faked;
here, the dealer seeks to manipulate information in a manner obscuring prices away

251. Gregory Day, Explaining the Art Market's Thefts, Frauds, and Forgeries (and Why
the Art Market Does Not Seem to Care), 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 486 (2014).
252. Id. at 485.
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from their efficient point.253 After all, an efficient market would include this
information. Beyond merely concealing information, it is common for dealers,
owners, and auctioneers to then fill the market with contrary information in hopes of
driving prices up.
But rather than compelling dealers to disseminate only accurate information, or
otherwise forbidding them from spreading false statements, the art market lacks any
type of regulating structure. As a former FBI agent stated about the art market, it is
a “last sort of bastion[] of unregulated business . . . [i]f you’re a collector, if you’re
in this art world, it truly is buyer beware.”254 Notable is the importance of
misinformation on downstream transactions: a seller who knows of adverse
information has no duty to share it. Instead, buyers are tasked with the plenary
responsibility of determining whether a work is fraudulent or stolen.255 Consider that
one dealer could supply a forged authenticity statement, which later sellers could
supply.256
At issue is that buyers can struggle to sue for fraud upon buying a forged or stolen
painting when clandestine information exists about the work’s value. By
incorporating fraud-on-the-market into the art market, buyers could purchase works
with added confidence if sellers could no longer shroud information. This would
allow buyers to allege fraud by virtue of merely purchasing a work at prices distorted
by lies, misstatements, or materially misleading comments. And given the
informational problems plaguing the art market, it would at least begin to remedy the
types of issues dissuading people from buying art as well as depressing its value. The
point is indeed that the art market is similarly prone to misinformation, which a fraudon-the-market theory could help to ameliorate.
2. Cryptocurrencies
An area in which fraud-on-the-market could help is cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies exist in something of a categorical abyss, with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) electing not to classify popular cryptocurrencies like
Bitcoin and Ether as securities.257 The SEC’s conclusion was that the current
decentralized version of the cryptocurrencies did not satisfy the definition of a
security.258 While observers in the industry cheered the decision of the SEC, it could
leave some cryptocurrency investors with little remedy if they suffer losses.

253. See id. at 479–80.
254. Scott Cohn, Think You Can Spot a Fraud? This $80 Million Art Scam Fooled the
Experts, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/16/think-you-canspot-a-fraud-this-80-million-art-scam-fooled-experts.html [https://perma.cc/YB9Z-BP3K]
(quoting Meridith Savona).
255. See Benedetta Ricci, The Art of Forgery – Art Forgers Who Duped the World,
ARTLAND, https://magazine.artland.com/the-art-of-forgery-art-forgers-duped-world/ [https://
perma.cc/9FPB-9XN2].
256. See id.
257. Louise Matsakis, Rest Easy, Cryptocurrency Fans, Ether and Bitcoin Aren’t
Securities, WIRED (June 14, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/sec-ether-bitcoinnot-securities/ [https://perma.cc/GZ2F-TZ2H].
258. Id.
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This is potentially problematic because the cryptocurrency market has attracted
fraud based upon misleading statements. Another example occurred when John
McAfee, formerly of antivirus software fame, used his Twitter account to perpetrate
an alleged pump-and-dump scheme.259 The claim is that his “lies and deception”
caused investors to overvalue “altcoins” in a manner allowing him to generate
millions of dollars.260 OneCoin reflects a similar scam where the currency’s value
was derived from false statements in creating a $4 billion Ponzi scheme.261 Indeed,
rather than anecdotes, the enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies has generated numerous
scams. On May 22, 2021, the issuers of a cryptocurrency, DeFi100, announced, “We
scammed you guys and you can’t do shit about it. HA HA. All you moon bois [sic]
have been scammed and you can’t do shit about it.”262 The Federal Trade
Commission has notably commented that reports of crypto scams have
“skyrocketed.”263
Recall, though, that investors would have little ability to sue for fraud if the
investor has not directly come into contact with the misstatements and invested
because of them. After all, especially in industries where excitement fuels
investments—such as with cryptocurrencies—it would seem unduly burdensome for
investors to prove reliance on specific statements in order to prove fraud. In other
words, given the connection of some cryptocurrencies to influencers, it is far from a
stretch to envision statements being made by a highly public figure impacting the
price of a cryptocurrency.264 The indeterminate status of cryptocurrencies threatens
to leave investors with fewer remedies than other types of investments, but an
extension of the fraud-on-the-market theory could help protect investors.

259. Jonathan Stempel & Chris Prentice, UPDATE 3-Antivirus Pioneer McAfee Charged
by U.S. with Cryptocurrency Fraud, YAHOO! FIN. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/1-u-says-john-mcafee-171457564.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
[https://perma.cc/C4GB-24R8].
260. Id.
261. Jamie Crawley, $4B Ponzi Scheme OneCoin and ‘CryptoQueen’ Leader Found in
Default in US Lawsuit, COINDESK (Sept. 14, 2021, 8:56 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/4bponzi-scheme-onecoin-and-cryptoqueen-leader-found-in-default-in-us-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/S86M-7GVJ].
262. Ryan Broderick, Inside the Cryptocurrency Scam Vortex, VERGE (Jun. 10, 2021,
10:05
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/22522380/cryptocurrency-scams-hacks-bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/23VG-VDQ8].
263. Emma Fletcher, Cryptocurrency Buzz Drives Record Investment Scam Losses, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (May 17, 2021, 10:29 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/dataspotlight/2021/05/cryptocurrency-buzz-drives-record-investment-scam-losses
[https://perma.cc/L5SJ-67VW].
264. For purposes of illustration, consider the potential influence of Tesla’s Elon Musk on
the meme-based cryptocurrency, Dogecoin. See, e.g., Alicia Adamczyk, What’s Behind
Dogecoin’s Price Surge—and Why Seemingly Unrelated Brands Are Capitalizing on Its
Popularity, CNBC (May 12, 2021, 12:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/12/dogecoinprice-surge-elon-musk-slim-jim.html [https://perma.cc/K8TS-9GXE] (discussing Elon
Musk’s connection to Dogecoin).
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CONCLUSION
This Article provides empirical support for fraud-on-the-market via analysis of
the sports gambling market. It makes the case that sports markets must allow those
who bet via DFS, or league-endorsed sportsbooks, to redress fraud and cheating
scandals. No longer may the leagues and teams claim that gambling occurs
exogenously to their competitions, given their entanglement with DraftKings and
FanDuel. They indeed profit lucratively from delivering their fans to the sports
gambling industry. To remedy cheating, gamblers should be able to remedy
informational injuries plaguing wagering markets just as securities markets protect
investors from fraud. By recognizing the fraud-on-the-market theory, investors
should be able to show that they relied on price signals in wagering, which teams and
leagues distorted with cheating. Giving gamblers a cause of action would incentivize
firms to identify and punish cheating rather than turning a blind eye as well as failing
to punish the culprit. It would thus improve the integrity of sports. Recognizing,
though, that fraud-on-the market is beleaguered in securities litigation, this research
provides support for it across the sea of investable markets.
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